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ATHEOLOGYANDBUDDHALOGYIN 
DHARMAKIRTI'S PRAMANA VARTTIKAl 
Roger R. Jackson 
This article seeks to clarify the relation between arguments for atheism and 
descriptions of the summum bOllum in Indian Buddhism, through the analysis 
of one influential text. I begin by noting that a number of writers have detect-
ed a tension between, on the one hand, Buddhist refutations of the existence 
of "God" (fsvara, litman, pUTU$a) and, on the other, Buddhist (especially 
Mahayana) claims about the nature of the ultimate (nirvaJ;la, buddha, dhar-
Illakiiya), which often appears to have God-like qualities. I then turn to a locus 
classicus of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of religion, the Pramal.1ilSiddhi 
("Establishment of Authority") chapter of the PramaJ;lavarttika 
("Commentary on Authority") of DharmakIrti (7th century CE). After briefly 
introducing Dharmakirti and the Pramaryilsiddhi chapter, I examine first the 
chapter's atheological passages, which include a systematic attack on a 
Hindu (Nyaya) "argument from design" and a number of important claims 
about the implausibility of any permanent "spiritual" principle. The argu-
ments are complex and varied, but most turn on the crucial Buddhist 
assumption that a permanent entity is by definition incapable of interaction 
with the impermanent, hence utterly unsuitable as a cause or effect. 1 then 
examine the chapter's buddha logical passages, which tend to stress that a 
Buddha is defined above all by his knowledge of what is to be avoided and 
adopted by those intent on freedom, i.e., his knowledge of the four noble 
truths. The Buddha thus described is less notable for his transcendental 
nature than for his wise, compassionate, and skillful engagement with the 
world and its creatures-hence less obviously Mahayanist than the Buddha 
described by those who articulate a "three-body" (trikaya) theory. I note by 
way of conclusion that, though Dharmakrrti's buddhalogy did not prove as 
influential as his atheology, the juxtaposition of the two reveals an overall 
metaphysical consistency, in which axiomatic assumptions about perma-
nence, impermanence, and deity are in harmony rather than tension. 
1. J ntroduction 
Buddhism often is described as a non-theistic religion.' If we follow Van 
Harvey in defining theism as "a system of thought in which is poshllated 
the existence of one unified, perfect being that, although distinguished 
from the cosmos, is the source of it and continues to sustain it in its forms 
and powers and, in some sense, providentially guides it,"3 we discover 
ample evidence from over a thousand years' worth of texts that Indian 
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Buddhists often denied the existence of such a being. From the gently satir-
ical rejection of the creatorhood of Brahma attributed to the Buddha in the 
DTglla Nikaya of the Pali canon (last centuries BCE), to rational denials of 
the concept of Tsvara by such philosophers as Ratnakirti and 
Mok?akaragupta not long before Buddhism's demise in the subcontinent 
(11th-12th centuries CE), an impressive range of Buddhist thinkers' con-
tributed to their tradition's ongoing critique of the theistic metaphysics 
promoted by numerous Hindu schools, most conspicuously the Nyaya.5 
At the same time, many scholars have suggested that the characteriza-
tion of Buddhism as non-theistic must be qualified. Some have noted ironi-
cally that, for all their "atheism," Buddhist theorists consistently found a 
place in their cosmos for the great deities of Hindu tradition, including the 
purported creator, Brahma, or that ordinary Buddhist practitioners, both 
"HInayana" and "Mahayana," acted towards their supreme exemplar, the 
Buddha, in ways reminiscent of the devotees of theistic traditions. Neither 
of these is a terribly compelling argument for Buddhist theism, for even if 
he is recognized to exist, the Buddhist Brahma lacks the supremacy 
assigned to him by Hindus (indeed, he is still enmeshed in the cycle of 
rebirths, sa1!lsara) and devotion to a tradition's supreme exemplar hardly 
assures that that tradition is theistic (for devotion is possible toward a 
range of "divinities"). More serious are arguments to the effect that 
Buddhist texts may in many cases be overtly anti-theistic, but, in fact, con-
tain crypto-theistic assumptions. A number of scholars have pointed to the 
Buddha's overall reluctance, in the Pali canon, to state metaphysical propo-
sitions, and to his specific failure to deny the existence of the supreme prin-
ciple of Upani$adic Hinduism, brahman, as evidence that he accepted a 
transcendent reality, but simply would not assert it positively." Others have 
pointed to Mahayana formulations in which the supreme buddha-principle, 
dharmakaya, is given many of the same attributes as brahman and/or 
Isvara-e.g., omniscience, omnibenevolence, immutability, or pervasive-
ness-to argue that, even if it was originally non-theistic, Buddhism 
increasingly moved in a theistic direction.7 Still others have suggested that, 
even if Buddhist atheism was sustained through the classic Hinayana and 
Mahayana philosophical texts, its breakdown is at least evident in the 
tantric literature that increasingly shaped Buddhist thought from the mid-
first millennium CE onward, as, for instance, in the Buddha's claim in the 
Hevajra Tantm (Lviii.41) that "The whole of existence arises in me, / In me 
arises the threefold world, / By me pervaded is this all, / Of nought else 
does the world consist. US 
it is doubtful that any of the notions of the ultimate or of buddha just 
cited would fit precisely with Harvey's narrow definition of theism, cited 
above. However, those who note such trends in Buddhist thought remind 
us that we cannot simply accept a tradition's critique of someone else's 
idea of ultimacy without examining that tradition's own ideas of ultimacy 
at the same time, for such an examination may yield surprising or ironic 
results. Unfortunately, too much discllssion of such matters still is couched 
in the language of "t/ze tradition," as if there were unanimity, or even con-
sistency, among all the Buddhists who lived and thought and wrote in 
India through nearly two millennia. Conclusions about a "tradition" must 
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be hard-won, built through careful induction, a slow accretion of examples 
drawn from the lives and writings of individual Buddhists, which must be 
weighed and counter-poised. Cognizant that Buddhists' refutations of the-
ism must be balanced by analysis of the their own sense of the SUll111lUlI1 
bonum, but reluctant to characterize the tradition and its outlook as a 
whole, I will devote this essay to exploring the anti-theistic arguments-
i.e., the atheology-and the conception of buddha-i.e., the bUddhalogt-
in the work of a single Indian philosopher, Dharmakirti (c. 600-660 CE), in 
the hope that such a twofold exploration will tell us something about the 
wavs in which one Buddhist (and maybe more) reconciled the denial of 
on~ notion of ultimacy with the assertio~ of another. 
II. DIlarmakirti, the Pramal.1avarttika, and the Pramal)asiddhi Chapller 
Dharmakirti probably lived during the seventh century CE, a time of inten-
sive, nuanced, and forensically advanced discussion and debate among the 
various schools of Indian philosophy. According to legend, he was born to 
Brahmin parents in south India, and mastered a number of Hindu systems 
of thought, most notably the MImaI]1sa, before turning to Buddhism in his 
teens. He became a Buddhist layman, traveled north, and took monastic 
vows. From his master, I§varasena, he learned the tradition of logic and 
epistemology founded a generation before by I§varasena's own teacher, 
Dignaga, widely recognized as the first great systematic Buddhist logician. 
Working out of a Buddhist ontological, cosmological, and soteriological 
framework, Dignaga had drawn on technical innovations developed in 
such non-Buddhist schools as the Nyaya and MimaI]1sa to formulate a 
sophisticated theory of pramaI)a, variously translated as "epistemic 
authority" or "sources of valid cognition."lIJ Dharmakirti soon surpassed 
I§varasena in his understanding of Dignaga's thought, and, settling in 
Orissa, established himself as one of the leading Buddhist thinkers of the 
day. He engaged Hindu and other opponents in public debate, and com-
posed a number of important verse-treatises on pramc'ina, which deal with 
such topics as the structure of formal inference, the nature of perception, 
the ontology of momentariness, the defects of solipsism, procedures for 
philosophical debate, and the rational defensibility of the Buddhist world-
view. The sophistication and rigor that Dharmaklrti brought to his argu-
ments assured that his influence would be lasting. Indeed, from his own 
time until the collapse of Buddhism in India, he probably was the Buddhist 
thinker most widely reviled by non-Buddhists and-with the possible 
exception of Nagarjuna-the writer most widely quoted, paraphrased, and 
commented upon by Buddhists themselves. And, as early as the thirteenth 
century, he assumed his place among Tibetan Buddhists as the logician 
and epistemologist par excellence, whose works are memorized and studied 
intently to this day.l1 
Among the philosophical views assumed or expounded by 
Dharmakirti, a few deserve special mention, for they form an important 
background to his discussion of atheology and buddhalogy. The ontology 
propounded in his works is, on one level, what we may roughly call "ide-
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alist," or "phenomenalist," for Dharmaklrti maintains that all entities ulti-
mately are "percept-only" (vijiiaptimatra); on a conventional level, howev-
er, the distinction between subjects and objects is meaningful, though those 
subjects and objects, i.e., all entities, are understood to be compounded 
(salJlskrta), radically impermanent (anitya, k$al.1ika), bereft of enduring 
substance (anatma), and inescapably plural and impersonal, yet still char-
acterized by causal efficiency (arthakriyatva), both atomically and in aggre-
gate. In his approach to language and meaning, Dharmaklrti is generally 
"nominalist," maintaining that there is no intrinsic connection between 
words and the objects they denote, and that there exist no universals 
(samanya), our apprehension of generalities proceeding through a process 
of exclusion (apoha) of non-similarities. Epistemologically, he accepts two, 
and only two, sources of authority (pramaI)a), perception and inference. Of 
the two, only perception-which is divided into sensory, mental, apper-
ceptive, and yogic varieties-gives us objects directly, as the particulars 
that they actually are (svalak!;iaI)a). Inference gives us objects indirectly, but 
veridically, through a "mark," "sign," or "reason" (hetu, liriga) whose pres-
ence in a situation allows us to infer from the seen and known to the 
unseen and unknown, as, in the classic example, we deduce that there is 
fire on a distant hill from the presence there of smoke, which is known on 
the basis of repeated observation (Le., inductively), to be an invariable con-
comitant of fire. In this sense, the authority of inference ultimately is 
"assured by virtue of actual entities" (vastubalapravrtta) that are subject to 
direct perception. With respect to the laws and limits of reason (i.e., formal 
and informal inference), Dharmaklrti presupposes Indian versions of (inter 
alia) the principles of contradiction and the excluded middle, and employs 
a five-part syllogism (subject, predicate, reason, accompanied by positive 
and negative examples) that is very similar, if not identical, to syllogisms 
used by members of non-Buddhist traditions. He also assumes that, while 
inference has its limitations, it will be veridical in any case where it can be 
"assured by virtue of actual entities," and that such assurance is available 
with respect to both worldly and some transcendental matters. Thus, prop-
er reasoning will give us a reliable basis for the achievement of human pur-
poses (puTU$arthasiddhl) both trivial and crucial-which achievement, 
according to Dharmaklrti, is both the raison d'etre of our search for truth, 
and the final guarantee that the knowledge we have gained is true. 
Of Dharmaklrti's writings on logic and epistemology," it is the earliest 
and most comprehensive, the PramaI)avarttika ("Commentary on 
Authority"), that has been the most widely studied, in India, in Tibet, and 
in the modern academy.ll Dharmakirti purportedly composed the 
Pramal.1avarttika as a commentary on Dignaga's masterwork, the 
PramaI)c1Samuccaya ("Compendium on Authority"). He does address 
many of the same topics as his predecessor, but the two works are orga-
nized quite differently, reflect different emphases, and sometimes differ on 
basic points of logic and epistemology.'1 For all effects and purposes, the 
Prama1.lavarttika may be regarded as an independent work-and has been 
treated thus by most of its commentators, ancient and modem. The text is 
divided into four chapters: (1) Svarthi1numana ("Inference for Oneself"), 
which discusses inferential procedure and the nature of meaning, (2) 
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Prama1)asiddhi ("Proof of Authority"), which establishes a general defini-
tion of epistemic authority and its applicability to the Buddha, (3) 
Pratyak~a ("Perception"), which explores the nature and varieties of per-
ception, and argues that external reality is "percept-only" (vijnaptimMra), 
and (4) Pararthanumana ("Inference for Others"), which analyzes the 
structure and applications of a formal inference, or syllogism. 15 
It is in the second chapter, Prama1)asiddhi, that Dharmaklrti lays out his 
atheology and buddhalogy.16 This chapter is the most explicitly "religious" 
of all Dharmaklrti's writings, and is a strong candidate for the locus classicus 
for attempts to argue rationally for the truth of the Buddhist world-view. As 
Daniel Arnold puts it, "Dharmaklrti's work concerns what it is about reality 
tlUlt makes a Buddha possible."17 It is organized around a discussion of five epi-
thets assigned to the Buddha by Dignaga at the beginning of his 
Pramanasamuccaya: the Authoritative One (prama1)abhiita)/8 Universally 
Benevolent (jagadhitai~in; or Compassionate, dayavan), Teacher (sastr), 
Well-Gone (sllgata), and Savior (or Protector, tayin). In Dignaga's scheme, 
explicated in his auto-commentary to the verse, the Authoritative One is 
taken as the fundamental epithet, while the other four explain his authorita-
tiveness. Thus, the Buddha's quality of being Universally Benevolent indi-
cates that he has perfected the causes of buddhahood with respect to inten-
tion, of Teacher that he has perfected the causes with respect to application, 
of Well-Gone that he has perfected results with respect to his own aims, of 
Savior that he has perfected results with respect to the aims of others.19 
The Pramal.1asiddhi chapter itself begins with a brief definition of epis-
temic authority, as a fresh, uncontradicted cognition (verses 1-6), then 
asserts that the Buddha is "like that," i.e., is the Authoritative One (verse 
7); it then refutes the authoritativeness and existence of an alternative can-
didate for such status, the Hindu creator God, isvara (verses 8-28), and 
shows generally that the Buddha's authoritativeness lies in his knowledge 
of what is to be avoided and adopted (ru:yopadeya) by those intent on liber-
ation (verses 29-33). 
The rest of the chapter (verses 33-285) is devoted to a proof that the 
Buddha is the Authoritative One, through a demonstration that he is, in 
fact, worthy of being described as Universally Benevolent, Teacher, Well-
Gone, and Savior. Most commentators note that the chapter contains two 
such demonstrations. The "forward" (anuloma) demonstration (verses 1-
146a21 ) proves that the Buddha is the Authoritative One because he has 
developed compassion over countless lives (i.e., is Universally Benevolent), 
as an entailment of which he has attained liberating wisdom (i.e., is 
Teacher), has freed himself from all defilement (i.e., is Well-Gone), and has 
provided others with the keys to their own freedom (i.e., is Sa vior). 
Because the long-term development of compassion and other positive 
traits is the key to this forward demonstration, Dharmaklrti devotes most 
of it to arguing, against a materialist opponent, that the multiple lives 
required to accomplish buddhahood do exist, because mind is ultimately 
different and separable from the body (verses 34-119), and that because of 
the mind's differences from the body, its qualities may be developed to the 
nth degree (verses 120-131). 
The reverse demonstration (verses 146b-285) proves that the Buddha is 
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the Authoritative One because he teaches salvific truths (is Savior), which 
assures us, in turn, that he has freed himself from defilement (is Well-
Gone), gained liberating wisdom (is Teacher), and has developed infinite 
compassion (is Universally Benevolent). Because the salvific truth of what 
he teaches is the key to this reverse demonstration, most of this section is 
devoted to arguing that the four noble truths are, in fact, true, through 
showing that alternative expositions of suffering (verses 147-179a) the ori-
gin of suffering (verses 179b-190a), the cessation of suffering (verses 190b-
205a), and the path to the cessation of suffering (verses 205b-280a)-for 
instance by the Vaise$ika, Sarpkhya, Nyaya, and Jaina schools-are inco-
herent, and the Buddha's exposition of them demonstrably true. The most 
extensive arguments here are with regard to the path, i.e., the knowledge 
required for liberation, which Dharmakrrti shows to be the wisdom that 
realizes no-self. 
Several times during the course of these discussions, Dharmakirti 
expounds either an atheology or a buddhalogy. We will examine the athe-
ological passages first, then the buddhalogical. 
IIT. DharmakIrti's Atheology 
There are several places in the PramaIJasiddhi chapter of the 
Pramal,lavarttika where Dharmaklrti argues against theistic opponents. In 
verses 8-28, during a discussion of the definition and examples of epis-
temic authority (pramaIJa), he (a) attacks the idea that fsvara fulfills the 
definition of epistemic authority and (b) refutes a Naiyayika syllogism 
intended to prove that isvara is the creator of the world; this may be the 
most important single anti-theistic passage in all of Buddhist literature. In 
verses 176b-179a and 183, in the course of his discussion of the truths of 
suffering and origination, he argues that sufferings are impermanent and 
multiple, and cannot be caused by a single, permanent agent, e.g., isvara or 
Mman. In verses 202b-203a and 220b-270, during his discussion of the 
truths of cessation and the path, he argues against the soteriological effica-
cy of a variety of a variety of Hindu versions of a permanent self, such as 
atman and pUTU/?a, maintaining that such a self cannot affect impermanent 
entities, or itself be subject to either bondage or liberation. With philosophi-
cal rather than philological concerns at the forefront, we will examine each 
of these sets of passages in turn, then comment briefly on their reception in 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist circles. 
A. The Locus Classicus: PV II: 8-28" 
Dharmakirti's most extensive and influential attack on theism comes 
near the beginning of the PramaIJasiddhi chapter, in a section devoted to a 
general demonstration of the Buddha's status as the Authoritative One 
(pramaIJabhata). In the first six verses of the chapter, Dharmakrrti estab-
lishes the characteristics of epistemic authority, pramal,la, that must be 
instantiated in a person or entity if they are to be regarded as authoritative. 
Fundamentally, authority is said to be a cognition (jilanam) that is uncon-
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tradicted or non-deceptive (avisalJlvadl), because it stands up to pragmatic 
tests, i.e., is invariable with respect to causal efficiency or purposive action 
(arthakriyasthithiN (verse 1a). Authority must be cognitive (dh1), and not, 
say, sensory, because cognition is the ultimate source of the purposive 
action or avoidance that is the nature of our being in the world (verses 3a-
Sa). Because authority rests ultimately in a cognition, and cognitions may 
be deceptive or not, the words, sentences, and treatises that verbalize cog-
nitions have limited authority: they assure us only of the speaker or 
writer's intention to express an object-they do not guarantee the reality of 
the object, which only can be determined by pragmatic tests (verses 1b-2, 
Sa). Additionally, authority is specified to involve the elucidation of objects 
not previously cognized (ajiie"itarthaprakasah); this means that representa-
tional cognitions subsequent to an initial direct cognition of an object as it 
really is, in its own characteristics (svala~aIJ.e), are not, strictly speaking, 
authoritative, though they may not be entirely deceptive, either (verses Sb-
6). In short-and there are other points, and qualifications to these points, 
that I have ignored here-an authority is a fresh, unsublated cognition. 
Having established a number of the crucial characteristics of authority, 
Dharmakirti goes on to assert that "the Blessed One is such an authority" 
(tadvat pramanaT!l bhagaviin) (verse 7a). He adds that the purpose of spec-
ifying-as Dignaga did at the beginning of the PramaIJ.asamuccaya-that 
the Buddha is the Authoritative One, Of, more literally, "became authority" 
(pramaIJ.abhiita), is to reverse the idea that he has not become authoritative, 
since authority depends on the accomplishment of aims, and the Buddha 
has accomplished his aims; that accomplishment, in turn, assures the valid-
ity of the cognitions that are behind the words he speaks and the actions he 
performs (verses 7a-b). A Buddha is, finally, Buddha-cognitions, so it does 
not contradict the definition of authority to state that the Buddha is, 
indeed, authority. This reading of the verse focuses on the authority part of 
the phrase "became authority"; there is an alternative interpretation, sug-
gested by the commentator Manorathanandin, that focuses on the 
"became," which is said to be specified to counter the idea that an entity 
that is non-becoming, i.e., permanent, ever could be authoritative or 
accomplish aims, while an entity that "becomes," i.e., is impermanent, is 
capable of accomplishing aims-for aims are related to the actual charac-
teristics of entities, which invariably are impermanent.23 
Incidentally, it is worth noting at the outset of the main discussion that, 
for Indian Buddhists, an entity that is "permanent" (nitya, or "eternal," sas-
vata) is by definition an unconditioned simple, hence incapable of being 
affected by, or affecting, impermanent entities. Were a permanent entity to 
interact with the impermanent, it would acquire thereby a degree of tem-
poral specificity and spatial limitation that would, say the Buddhists" entail 
internal complexity or variability, neither of them acceptable in an uncon-
ditioned simple. Buddhists find such complexity or variability unaccept-
able because (in an application of a version of the law of the excluded mid-
dle) they further assume that permanence and impermanence are exhaus-
tive, mutually exclusive contradictories: each entity is one or the other, 
while no entity can be both. This radically dichotomous view of the rela-
tion between the permanent and the impermanent was not, in general, 
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shared by the Buddhists' Indian opponents. Jainas, for instance, argued 
that most entities are qualified by both permanence and impermanence, 
depending on one's point of view, while Hindu thinkers of many stripes 
insisted that the permanent principle at the heart of things (atman, brah-
man, puru!?a, etc.) was at one and the same time an lU1conditioned simple 
and capable of affecting or effecting impermanent entities. The Buddhists, 
for their part, would reply that theirs is the only view that takes seriously 
the real meaning of the terms "permanent" and "impermanent" -and to 
take them seriously, they insist, is to see that they are utterly different, 
totally incompatible terms, and that any attempt to predicate both of the 
same entity is only the result and cause of linguistic and philosophical con-
fusion. Whether or not Buddhists can finally support this set of claims, it is 
important to keep them in mind in the discussion that follows. 
1. I§vara's Unsuitability as an Authority 
Regardless of whether Dharmakirti's assertion in verse 7 that the 
Buddha has "become authority" looks back to his definition of authority or 
forward to his rejection of non-authoritative entities, that rejection unques-
tionably begins in the following verse. There, he argues that there is no 
such thing as a permanent authority (nityaIJI pramal)aIJI naivasti), i.e., 
isvara,24 for an authority always is a cognition of some entity (vastu), and 
knowable entities (jfieya) invariably are impermanent (anitya). This being 
so, all cognitions, too, must be impermanent, for cognitions invariably con-
form to their objects.2s Impermanent cognitions would be successive in 
nature (kramajanmana,l), and it is quite impossible that succession of any 
sort could be posited of a permanent being, for succession implies alter-
ation or difference, and that which is permanent never changes. If one 
were to argue that a permanent authority retains its permanence, but cog-
nizes impermanent entities through auxiliary conditions, then these auxil-
iary conditions would be the true cognizing subjects, so authority could 
not be predicated of the permanent entity. One cannot retreat to the asser-
tion that isvara is impermanent, for IS\Tara also is said to be eternally liber-
ated; never having been subjected to the vicissitudes of saIl1sara, he cannot 
be helped or hindered in any way-and such a being could not reasonably 
be asserted to be "affected" as cognizing agents are (for liberation is free-
dom from causes and conditions), let alone to care about what happens to 
beings who are bound in saIJIsara, since sympathy can arise only in a being 
with an experience of being helped or hindered. 
2. Refutation of a Theistic Syllogism 
DharmakIrti then trains his sights on a tripartite argument for isvara's 
existence, most likely proffered by a representative of the Hindu Nyaya 
school.'" DharmakIrti merely presents the three logical reasons given by his 
opponent to show that things must be created by isvara: "because they are 
intermittently active, they have particular shapes, and they effect purpos-
es" (verse lOa).27 The Tibetan commentator rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen 
fleshes this out into a more formal syllogism: 
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"Worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by the mind 
of a maker, because (a) they are intermittently active, like a hatchet 
[that must be brought from rest into motion], (b) they have particular 
designs, like a pot [that depends for its arrangement on a potter], and 
(c) they effect purposes, like a battle-axe [that is constructed with cer-
tain ends in mind]."28 
Dharmakirti rejects this argument (verse lOb) on the grounds that it con-
tains at least three logical flaws. First, in the version presented above, the 
thesis is redundant (i?tasiddhi(l). It was a requirement of Indian argumen-
tation that one demonstrate something not demonstrated before, and the 
assertion that worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded by the 
mind of a maker already is proven for the Buddhist, since the Buddhist 
accepts that the world and its beings are effected with karmic intentions 
(cetana) as their maker. If the Naiyayika were to specify that the maker 
referred to is ISvara, then a second flaw would ensue: the examples sup-
porting the argument are unproven (asiddhi(l ... drsfante), for such things 
as hatchets, pots, and battle-axes are impermanent, and only are known 
directly to be affected or effected by impermanent beings, leaving the rela-
tion between them and a permanent entity such as Isvara uncertain. 
Furthermore, the argument is dubious (samsayo 'thava), because while it 
may leave open the possibility (however remote) that Isvara is the creator, 
it does not preclude other possible makers-e.g., impermanent karmic 
intentions-that may, upon further analysis, tum out to be asserted more 
plausibly to lie behind the origination of things. 
In the eighteen verses that follow, Dharmakirti argues in detail against 
each of the three reasons adduced by the theist for Isvara's status as cre-
ator, attacking in tum what we might call the argument from design (vers-
es 11-20[b )29), the argument from intermittence (verse 21), and the argu-
ment from effectuality (verses 22-28).30 
a. Refutation of the Design Argument 
Dharmakirti's most detailed and specific attack is directed at the analog-
ical design argument to the effect that, just as we infer from the particular 
shape of a pot that it must have had a conscious designer, so may we con-
clude from the particular arrangement of worldly abodes, bodies, and 
enjoyments that they, too, must have had a conscious designer. He points 
out first (verse 11) that the inference from a particular shape to a specific 
designer is reasonable only in instances where positive and negative con-
comitance (anvayavyatireka) has been established between the two, 
through induction. Yet, unlike in the case of a pot, we have no clear evi-
dence for the origins of worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments: we do not 
know from observation that the arrangement of things invariably has been 
preceded by a conscious designer fitting the description of Isvara, nor do 
we know that such an arrangement could not come about in the absence of 
such a designer. Furthermore, there is some question whether a pot is a 
suitable analogy for worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments, for the for-
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mer is a single, simple effect, while the latter is multiple and complex; 
might it not, therefore, as the Buddhist maintains, be the result of a multi-
plicity of complex causes? The theistic example is asked to bear too much 
weight: one simply cannot assume that all effects are brought about in the 
way that the shape of a pot is---especially when that which the pot exem-
plifies, i.e., worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments, is so very different 
from it. 
If, in the face of this critique, the theist abandons the pot analogy, and 
argues that it is simply because they exhibit design that worldly abodes, 
bodies, and enjoyments may be inferred to be created by isvara, 
Dharmakirti replies (verse 12) that it is logically inadmissible to infer from 
a general term, such as "designed," to a particular designer or mode of 
design, for observation assures us only that design may be effected in a 
variety of ways. Indeed, if it is reasonable to infer from a general character-
istic of an effect, such as "designed," to a specific cause, such as isvara, then 
it also would be reasonable to infer such absurdities as the presence of fire 
where there is greyness, simply because greyness is a characteristic of 
smoke. If the theist then retreats to the more specific pot analogy, but 
insists that a pot is roughly comparable in its design to worldly abodes, 
bodies, and enjoyments, Dharmakirti replies (verse 13) that even in cases 
where two effects are apparently comparable in design, the actual causes 
may turn out, on closer examination, to be quite different. In India, for 
instance, ant-mounds are shaped somewhat like pots, yet we know from 
observation that the latter is generally the result of a single, conscious 
maker, while the latter is the result of many makers, who may not be work-
ing according to any single conscious plan. At best, therefore, the design 
argument may establish the possibility of a conscious maker, but certainly 
not that that maker is isvara. 
b. Refutation of the Intermittence Argument 
After an important logical digression on the probative value of words, 
which, in line with his tendency toward nominalism, he regards as mini-
mal (verses 14-20[b]), Dharmaklrti turns to the theistic argument from 
intermittence, the claim that just as a hatchet requires a wielder to set it into 
motion after a period of disuse, so the arising of worldly abodes, bodies, 
and enjoyments, when they have not existed before, requires an extrinsic 
cause, which must be I~vara. Dharmakirti does not bother here (verse 21) to 
question the appropriateness of the analogy, as he has in the case of the 
pot, perhaps trusting that his reader will see that the same problems ensue. 
Rather, he assails the logic of asserting that isvara is the creator of specific 
entities, asking: "How, if an entity is a cause, can it also be a non-cause? 
How, when it is a cause, can it be asserted as a non-cause? It cannot."3l The 
point is that if entities are said to alter from a state of non-existence to a 
state of existence, then they have changed their nature; by the same token, 
their cause must also have changed nature, from being their non-cause to 
being their cause. This sort of alteration, however, is impossible for isvara, 
who is predicated as a permanent entity, hence incapable of any change 
whatsoever. An entity that itself is intermittent or impermanent might 
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plausibly be seen as a cause for intermittent or impermanent entities, but a 
permanent entity cannot function thus, so i~vara cannot be postulated as 
that which brings into existence entities that were previously non-existent, 
any more than (as in verses 8-9) he could be postulated as a permanent 
cognizer of impermanent entities-in either case, the requirement that he 
be permanent leaves him metaphysically dysfunctional. 
c. Refutation of the Effectuality Argument 
Finally (verses 22-28), Dharmaklrti attacks the theistic argument from 
effectuality. This is the claim that, just as a battle-axe is understood to 
"work" because it has been designed with certain purposes in mind by an 
axe-maker who is not evident at the time the battle-axe is put to use, yet 
that maker rightly is considered as the battle-axe's true cause; in the same 
way, worldly abodes, bodies, and enjoyments must be designed for certain 
purposes by a cause unseen at the time when they function according to 
their purposes, which cause must be ISvara. In his critique, DharmakIrti 
focuses on showing the absurdity of claiming that i~vara ever could be 
invoked as an unseen, permanent causal agent, i.e., a necessary condition, 
behind the causes that already suffice in this or that worldly situation. 
He argues first (verse 22) that if Isvara is invoked as an unseen efficient 
cause for things or events whose causes are observable, then we might as 
well argue that an irrelevant post is the "unseen" cause for the healing of 
Caitra's wound--even though we know perfectly well that it is healed by 
application of medicine or (via "sympathetic magic") the weapon that 
caused it. From Dharmaklrti's perspective, where adequate conventional 
causal explanations are available-and, as a Buddhist, he believes that ade-
quate conventional explanations are available in all causal situatilons-
there is no need to invoke any extra cause, whether worldly or transcen-
dental: in the curing of Caitra's wound, a post and Isvara are equally 
absurd as explanatory principles. A transcendental entity such as Jsvara, 
notes Dharmaklrti (verse 23), is especially inappropriate to invoke as a 
ubiquitous, unseen cause because, being permanent, he cannot alter his 
nature from one moment to the next. Just as (above, verse 21), if Isvara ever 
is a non-cause, he must remain forever a non-cause, so, if he is said to be a 
ubiquitous, but unseen causal factor in all situations, i.e., always a cause, 
then, as a permanent entity, he never can be absent-yet a cause is general-
ly understood, by Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike, to be a factor in the 
absence of which a particular result does not occur. Thus, ISvara cannot 
meaningfully be described as a cause. Indeed, concludes Dharmaklrti 
(verse 24), to invoke an additional unseen cause in situations where ade-
quate explanations are available, is to open the door to the possibility that 
there is no end at all to the causes of a particular effect, in which case 
causality becomes totalistic, hence, finally, inexplicable.32 
Dharmaklrti concludes this section (verses 25-28) by exemplifying his 
point. When we see (verse 25) that a harvest has been good, we know that 
the causes and conditions of that result, such as seeds, soil, sun, and mois-
ture, have, at a certain point, changed from being non-causes to being caus-
es-but this is not a problem, since they all are impermanent entities, 
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which sometimes are present and sometimes are absent. By the same token 
(verse 26), when a sense-cognition arises through contact between a sense-
faculty and a sense-organ, we know that-Naiyayika views notwithstand-
ing'3-those causes must have altered, for at one moment-when separat-
ed-they were incapable of producing a cognition, and in the next-when 
in contact-they did so. Again, a change from non-cause to cause means 
that alteration has occurred, hence that the factors involved are imperma-
nent. Indeed, says DharmakIrti (verses 27-28), we may conclude generally 
that in any case where a factor or factors are at one moment incapable of 
producing a result, and in the next moment able to produce it, they have 
changed their nature (svabhava), from causally impotent to causally 
potent, hence have undergone alteration. In fact, declares Dharmakirti with 
finality, causality (hetuta) only can be predicated of those factors that are 
powerless individually, but become causally efficacious in combination 
with other factors-i.e., only factors capable of alteration or variation; 
causality cannot be predicated of isvara and other permanent entities, 
because they are invariant (nesvarader abhedatalJ). 
B. I§vara and Suffering: PV II: 176b-179a, 183 
DharmakIrti next attacks the concept of ISvara during his discussion of 
the truths of suffering and origination, which form part of the extended 
proof of the four noble truths that occupies most of the last half of the 
PramaI)asiddhi chapter (verses 146b-280b). The logical purpose of this proof 
is to demonstrate that the Buddha rightly is designated as "the Savior" 
because the fundamental truths he teaches are conducive to liberation. In 
his analysis of the truth of suffering (verses 147-179a), Dharmaklrti is preoc-
cupied mainly with refuting a number of materialist claims to the effect that 
suffering (or the defilements that cause it) arise from, e.g., imbalances in the 
body's humors (do;;a) (verses 148-158a) or transformations of the physical 
elements (bhiita) that constitute it (verses 158b-176a). In concluding his dis-
cussion (verses 176b-179a), he first (verses 176b-177a) summarizes the clas-
sic Buddhist view of suffering as (a) transient (adhruva, or impermanent, 
anitya), because it arises occasionally, (b) suffering (dulJkha), because it is 
based on previous defilements, (c) without self (natma, or anatma), and (d) 
unfounded on (adhi;;thita, or empty of, siinya) any self. 
DharmakIrti then (verses 177b-178a) replies to a possible objection that 
suffering is not without a permanent basis, because it may be controlled by 
an entity such as Isvara (or Mman). A permanent entity, Dharmaklrti 
reminds us, cannot serve as the cause or controller of anything that is 
impermanent, multiple, and various. If suffering is acknowledged to be 
thus-and observation seems to vouchsafe the fact-then isvara cannot 
effect it, for he is invariant, and that which he is supposed to cause is ever-
changing and occasional. At the very best (and even this is unlikely, given 
the difficulties involved in explaining how the permanent and imperma-
nent can interact), a permanent creator could generate the effects (includ-
ing sufferings) of a single moment, but not the effects of a second moment, 
for to do so would require a change in nature, from being a non-cause of 
the second-moment effects to being their cause, and from being a cause of 
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the first-moment effects to being their non-cause. In this scenario (which 
sounds vaguely deistic) Isvara's control over suffering is seriously weak-
ened, for he effects only a single instant of it, and no subsequent moment. 
Alternatively, a permanent entity that is asserted to control all effects, 
including all sufferings, would have to generate those effects in one pri-
mordial moment, since it could not alter in a second moment; this, howev-
er, would mean that all effects, including all sufferings, would have existed 
eternally-which manifestly they do not. In fact, Dharmakirti reiterates 
(verses 178b-179a), a cause must be understood as a factor that makes a dif-
ference, i.e., that in the absence of which of an effect does not occur, and in 
the presence of which the effect will arise; Isvara, Mman, or any other per-
manent entity, must, if present once, always be present, but that which is 
always present cannot be a cause. 
In the discussion of the truth of origination that immediately ensues 
(verses 179b-190a), Dharmaklrti first establishes (verses 179b-182)--contra 
the materialists-that sufferings must have extrinsic causes, because they 
are occasional, and entities that sometimes occur and sometimes do not 
must be affected by factors that determine their occurrence; only perma-
nent or non-existent entities, whose occurrence or non-occurrence is invari-
able, can be said to be non-causative. By the same token, Dharmakirti 
reminds us (verse 183), suffering cannot o~iginate from Isvara or any other 
single, permanent entity, precisely because (a) such entities have been 
shown to be impossible and, (b) even if they did exist, as permanent they 
would be incapable of affecting impermanent entities, and as single, they 
would be incapable of effecting multiple and various results.34 
]n short, Dharmaki"rti's analysis of suffering and its origination leads 
him to conclude that no permanent entity can control the sufferings of sen-
tient beings; they must, rather, be under the control of appropriately multi-
ple and impermanent factors, such as the defilements and karma. 
C. Self and Liberation: PV 1I: 202b-203a, 220b-270 
Dharmakirti also attacks the concept of ISvara indirectly during his brief 
demonstration of the truth of cessation, and his much longer proof of the 
truth of the path. During his discussion of the truth of cessation, he argues 
that neither suffering nor liberation reasonably is predicated of a perma-
nent entity: 
Bondage is the very cause for the occurrence of suffering; how could 
it pertain to a permanent entity? 
Liberation is the absence of the cause for the occurrence of suffering; 
how could it pertain to a permanent entity?35 
The presumption here (as earlier, when the term bhiita was under discus-
sion) is that to use the terms "bondage" and "liberation" is to presuppose 
that some alteration occurs in a being such that he or she moves from a 
state of bondage to one of freedom-but such an alteration only is possible 
for an impermanent entity. Thus, one cannot speak, as so many Hindus 
and Jainas do, of a self, or person, or soul that is the experiencer of both 
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suffering and liberation-if there is more than one experience possible, 
then the experiencer must be impermanent, which none of these entities is 
asserted to be. 
The proof of the truth of path (verses 205b-2S0a) involves both demon-
strating the legitimacy of the Buddhist claim that a direct realization of no-
self (anMman) is the cause of liberation and criticizing a variety of non-
Buddhist approaches to liberation, including those of the VaiSe:;;ika, 
Sarp.kya, Nyaya, Vedanta (perhaps), and Jaina schools. The critique of the 
Jainas focuses on their view of austerities, rather than their belief in an 
immortal jiva, but many of Dharmaklrti's criticisms of Hindu schools in 
these sections (verses 220b-270) mav be read as an extension of the atheistic 
arguments he has proffered before, -to the effect that a permanent entity can-
not effect, affect, or in any way relate to impermanent phenomena-or, for 
that matter, since all phenomena are impermanent, be shown to exist at all. 
He confronts the Atmavadin contention (common in various ways to 
Vedanta, Vaise:;;ika, and Sarpkhya) that we will attain liberation by detach-
ing ourselves from imperfect, impermanent phenomena that are "related 
to the self" (atmiya, prakrtl) and identifying only with the pure self itself 
(atman, purusa) that is the experiencer of bondage and liberation, by not-
ing that, if, like a Vaise:;;ika, one believes that the self is the ground of phe-
nomena related to it, then, psychologically, detachment from those phe-
nomena will be impossible, and metaphysically, the relation between the 
pure, permanent self and impure, transient phenomena will be difficult to 
explain (verses 226b-247a); on the other hand, it like a Sarp.khya, one 
insists that the self is completely separate from phenomena, yet is still their 
"experiencer/' then one will be seeking an entity that no search, no matter 
how exhaustive, ever will reveat precisely because of its utter disconnec-
tion from any conceivable notion of how knowledge or its objects exist 
(verses 247b-252a). He criticizes the Naiyayika theory that liberation may 
be effected by a rite of purification sanctioned by scripture (or perhaps by 
Isvara), by noting that such rites cannot be shown to "work" in the mental 
realm as they work in the physical realm, not least because the alleged 
empowering agent, whether scripture or Isvara, is a permanent entity, 
hence incapable of effecting or affecting anything at all (252b-267a). In 
short, whether one asserts a permanent entity as the inseparable ground of 
things, as utterly separate from them, or separate yet interactive, such a self 
cannot change, and therefore cannot be regarded as an "experiencer/' or as 
itself moving from bondage to liberation, or as effecting others' liberation 
through scripture or ritual. Indeed, it cannot be shown to exist at alt so 
belief in, attachment to, or reliance upon it serves not to free one, but to 
mire one further in suffering. 
These arguments are less explicitly directed at theism (such as that of 
the Nyaya) than at the eternalism (sasvatavada) of the various Atmavadin 
schools, so we have not examined them in detait but to the degree that 
even overtly non-theistic Atmavadin schools had to account for the rela-
tion between a "unified, perfect being" and the multiple, imperfect cosmos, 
Dharmaklrti's critiques of absolutist views have implications for more con-
ventionally theistic positions, as well. Indeed, at the conclusion of his refu-
tation of Hindu soteriologies (verses 267b-269a), he clinches his argument 
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with a summary observation that is as applicable to the concept of isvara as 
to that of inman: 
It is contradictory that a permanent entity produce things in succes-
sion, for it is [by definition] independent [of auxiliary factors]; 
Such a self would have to be implicated in [both] action and non-
action [which is impossible for a permanent entity]; 
[If it is asserted that this self is both creator and experiencer, then] 
cause and effect will be identical, while if it is separate from them, 
Then creator- and experiencer-ness will be undermined, and their 
connection unproven.'" 
D. A Summary of Dllannakfrti'sAtheology 
In short, then, Dharmaklrti argues at various places in the Pramal)asid-
dlli chapter of the Pramal)avarttika that a permanent entity, whether des-
ignated as Isvara, atman, purw}a, or in some other way, cannot be regarded 
as (a) an epistemic authority, (b) an efficient cause, or (c) an experiencer of 
both bondage and liberation, for the very permanence of such an entity 
makes a mockery of knowledge, causation, and experience. These only are 
explicable if all elements of their operation are impermanent, and the view 
that all phenomena are radically impermanent is, of course, at the heart of 
Buddhist ontology, expressed in the doctrines of momentariness and no-
self. Thus, for Dharmaklrti, all events, all subjects and objects, are constant-
ly undergoing alteration: the world is thoroughly plural, such that each 
event is, finally, utterly different from each other event-although conven-
tionally, of course, we may speak of "connections," or "continuurns," or 
"relations" among those events. Authority, causation, and experience, 
therefore, are explained as processes, into which, by definition, no perma-
nent entity could possibly enter. 
E. The Reception of DhannakIrti's A theology 
As indicated near the outset, Dharmaklrti's refutation of theism in the 
Pramal)avarttika became one of the pivotal discussions of the "God" idea 
in the Indian intellectual tradition. If not immediately, then eventually, it 
prompted how Is of protest from Hindu philosophers, especially 
Naiyayikas such as Jayanta Bhatta, Vyomasiva, and Vacaspatimisra, and it 
served as the direct or indirect basis for nearly every Buddhist attack on 
theism that followed it. Thus, quite apart from comment~tors on the 
Pramal)avarttika, e.g., Devendrabuddhi, Prajfi.akaragupta, S~kyabodhi, 
J3.avigupta, and Yamari, such influential philosophers as Santideva, 
Santarak$ita, KamalasIla, Jfi.anasrimitra, Ratnaklrti, and Mok$akaragupta 
all were to one degree or another indebted to Dharmaklrti, though of 
course they included wrinkles of their own, partly in response to varying 
tacks taken by their opponents." Thus, while Dharmaklrti was far from 
entirely original in his arguments-indebted as he was to the authors of 
the nikayas and the likes of Vasubandhu and Bhavaviveka-and while his 
successors may have extended and deepened his arguments in various 
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ways, he nevertheless remains the central atheologian in the Indian 
Buddhist philosophical tradition, a figure no Buddhist or Hindu-and per-
haps no Christian, either---could afford to ignore. 
IV. DharmakIrti's Buddl1alogy 
Because it may be read as a commentary on Dignaga's claim, at the 
beginning of his PramaI)asamuccaya, that the Buddha is the Authoritative 
One, Universally Benevolent, Teacher, Well-Gone, and Savior, the entire 
PramaI)asiddhi chapter of the PramaI)avarttika is in a certain sense an 
exposition of DharmakIrti's buddhalogy. However, as befits his generally 
rationalistic approach to Buddhist philosophy, Dharmakirti is more con-
cerned to prove that these epithets reasonably may be asserted of the 
Buddha than to analyze the epithets and their implications in detail. Thus, 
we will not find in the Pramal.1asiddhi chapter any attempt at the sort of 
"systematic buddha logy" contained in such Mahayana "doctrinal digests" 
as the Mahayanasiitra1aJTlkara, Ratnagotravibhaga, Abhisamaya1arpkara, 
or Mahayanasarpgraha.38 Nevertheless, the five-epithet scheme that struc-
tures the PramaI)asiddhi chapter, as well as certain remarks found else-
where in the Pramc"iI)avarttika or its auto-commentary, do provide us with 
at least some sense of how DharmakIrti conceived the Buddha and why he 
did so; they may, therefore, help us to determine whether his buddhalogy 
is consistent with, or in contradiction to, his atheology. 
A. The Buddha as the Authoritative One: PV II: 1-33, 282b-285a 
The claim that the Buddha is the Authoritative One (pramaI)abhiita) is 
the most important single assertion of the Prama1J.asiddhi chapter, whose 
title, after all, may be glossed as "Proof (siddhi) that Buddha is an 
Authority (pramaI)a)." Within the broadly syllogistic structure of the chap-
ter, "Buddha is the Authoritative One" becomes the logical thesis to be 
proved through two alternative chains of reasoning. Thus, in the "forward 
demonstration," he is known to be the Authoritative One because he is 
Universally Benevolent (an attribute to be proven in detail); benevolence 
requires him to seek an antidote to suffering (the realization of no-self, 
which is the true Teacher), and through application of that to himself to 
achieve his own freedom (become Well-Gone), then-because of his 
benevolence, and through his knowledge and skill-to spread the antidote 
to others, becoming thereby their Savior. And, in the reverse demonstra-
tion, he is known to be the Authoritative One because he is a Savior (teach-
ing the salvific four noble truths, which must be proven in detail); his sav-
iorhood assures us that he has become free himself (is Well-Gone), and that 
that condition must have resulted from his application of the antidote to 
suffering (the Teacher), the search for which, in turn, was motivated by his 
being Universally Benevolent. 
These are all reasons purporting to prove that the Buddha truly is the 
Authoritative One and, as noted, they occupy much of the PramaI)asiddhi 
chapter. The question of in what the Buddha's authority actually consists is 
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treated rather more briefly, at the beginning and very end of the chapter. 
Thus, verses 1-33 may be regarded as an attempt to delimit the chapter's 
thesis, i.e., "the Buddha is the Authoritative One," by defining what 
authority is (verses 1-6), asserting that the Buddha fulfills the definition 
(verse 7), and showing generally why Isvara cannot be regarded as authori-
tative (verses 8-28), and the Buddha can (verses 29-33). We already have 
seen that Dharmak'i:rti generally defines authority as a fresh, unsublated 
cognition, and rejects Naiyayika claims that Isvara can be an example of 
such authority, for his permanence precludes his cognition of imperma-
nent entities; indeed, it precludes his being an agent of any kind. At the 
conclusion of his refutation of Isvara, then, Dharmakirti turns to a positive 
example of a being who instantiates authority, the Buddha. He starts (verse 
29) by quoting an unnamed opponent (probably a Mlmal11saka), who 
maintains that to be the Authoritative One requires extra-sensory percep-
tion (parok$arthajiianam), but that no such perception can be shown to 
exist, so no one can achieve it. In response to this skeptical stance,'9 he 
points out (verse 30) that what beings with spiritual concerns are seeking is 
simply a person who is sufficiently knowledgeable (jiianavan) that we may 
put his teaching into practice. We are, says Dharmaklrti (verse 31), only 
interested in whether such a person's teaching is practicable in light of our 
needs, not in whether he possesses such utterly useless knowledge as the 
number of insects in the world. In fact, he asserts (verse 32): 
One who knows what is to be adopted and what avoided, and the 
means of doing so 
Is the authority we seek-not someone who knows everything.40 
Indeed, notes DharmakIrti (verse 33), seeing far is hardly a reasonable crite-
rion for authoritativeness, for if it were, then we should look to vultures as 
our guides; no, what we should seek is someone who sees the facts or prin-
ciples needed (tattvam i$tarp) in a given situation. 
Near the very end of the PramaI)asiddhi chapter (verses 282b-285a), when 
he has completed his forward and reverse demonstrations that the Buddha 
is the Authoritative One, Dharmakirti adds to his characterization of that 
epithet by noting explicitly that the Buddha taught not just by appeal to per-
ception, but by using inferences, as well. Thus, a claim in the scriptures to the 
effect that "whatever comes into existence is subject to cessation" might not 
be framed in the form of a "syllogism" such as employed by Dignaga or 
DharmakIrti, but nevertheless is analyzable in formal terms. Here, perhaps 
in order to justify his own heavy reliance on inference, Dharmakiirti only 
states clearly that the Buddha utilized inferences in his teaching; implicit in 
the claim, however, would seem to be the likelihood that the Buddha himself 
entertained inferences-and, because inferences are instances of conceptual 
construction, that the Buddha did possess a conceptual mind.41 
In short, then, the Buddha's designation as the Authoritative One means 
that he has fresh, unsublated cognitions-both perceptual and inferential-
of what is to be avoided and what adopted, most especially with regard to 
the attainment of spiritual freedom. Implicit, but by no means clearly stated, 
in this claim would seem to be the conclusion that a Buddha's cognitions-
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and it is by his cognitions that he is most essentially defined-are (a) imper-
manent, momentary, and successive, (b) perhaps limited in extent, and (c) 
inclusive of both non-conceptual perceptions and constructed inferences. It 
seems, in other words, that, unlike many of his contemporaries, 
Dharmaklrti may not have regarded the Buddha as fundamentally etemaV2 
omniscient, or non-conceptual, but, rather, simply, as the sort of being who 
has veridical cognitions regarding what is to be avoided or adopted by 
those intent on freedom-whether this reflects Dharmakirti's full view or 
simply his minimal description is not, however, clear. 
B. The Buddha liS Universally Benevolent: PV II: 34-131, 193~199a, 282a 
In Dharmaklrti's "forward demonstration" that the Buddha is the 
Authoritative One, the fact that he is Universally Benevolent (jagadhitai$in) 
serves as the chief logical reason: "[t]he proof," he says (verse 34a) "is com-
passion" (sadhanaf!! karuna). DharmakIrti recognizes that the Buddha 
could not have achieved spiritual authoritativeness for suffering sentient 
beings without a powerful motive, and that motive must have been the 
desire to achieve not only his own liberation, but to affect the liberation of 
others, as well. However, the degree of benevolence or compassion attrib-
uted to the Buddha cannot be achieved in the scope of a single lifetime; it 
only, DharmakIrti suggests (verse 34a), can arise from accustomation, or 
repeated practice (abhyasat sa) over the course of many lives. The existence 
of multiple lives, i.e., the reality of rebirth, is not, however, self-evident, so 
DharmakIrti undertakes an extended discussion of the relation between 
mind and body (verses 34a-119), in the course of which he criticizes a num-
ber of possible materialist attempts to prove that mind is either identical to 
or an epiphenomenon of the body, arguing instead that mind and body are 
interactive processes, capable of affecting one another, but that they are 
substantially different enough that neither can serve as the "material 
cause" (upadanahetu) of the other; indeed, if one of the two has primacy, it 
is mind, not body. Thus, moments of mind must be preceded by other 
moments of mind, even at the beginning of life, so past lives are proven; 
and moments of mind will be succeeded by moments of mind as long liS 
craving and ignorance persist, so future lives are proven for all but the 
enlightened. 
Having proven to his own satisfaction (and that of generations of 
Buddhists) that rebirth is real, Dharmakirti has shown that there does exist 
a sufficient temporal span in which compassion might be developed to an 
extraordinary degree. His materialist opponent replies, however (verse 
120a-b), that even if multiple lives are a reality, mental qualities such as 
compassion only can be developed to a limited degree, just as human 
jumping ability, despite repeated practice, only can progress so far, and 
just as water, no matter how long it is boiled, never will ignite, but will, 
rather boil away. Dharmakirti replies (verses 120-131) that it is only in 
instances where one has to "start from scratch" each time (as in the case of 
jumping) or the basis is unstable (as in water boiling away) that such limi-
tations occur. Positive mental qualities such as compassion are not subject 
to the same limitations, for those qualities intensify incrementally over 
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time, without the need to "start from scratch," in part because they have a 
stable basis, which is a clear, correct, concentrated awareness that, once 
"naturalized," cannot be uprooted or destabilized. In short, given sufficient 
time and training, any being is capable of developing compassion to the 
nth degree, so it is reasonable to assert that the Buddha is Universally 
Benevolent. That universal benevolence, in tum, serves both as a motive 
for his spiritual quest, and, when he has attained liberation, as the basis for 
his teaching others the salvific truths and practices he has discovered (see, 
e.g., verses 282b-283a). 
Throughout this whole discussion, DharmakIrti is concerned primarily 
to establish the conditions for the possibility of the Buddha's universal 
benevolence, namely, the independence of mind from particular bodies 
and the incremental development of positive mental qualities. He does not 
go into detail on the precise extent of the Buddha's compassion, or the vari-
ous ways in which it might be manifest. As with his account of what it 
means for the Buddha to be the Authoritative One, he rests content with a 
relatively "minimal" characterization, though it also is clear here, as it was 
not in his description of what it means to be the Authoritative One, that 
DharmakIrti does have a very strong belief in the infinite expandability of a 
Buddha's positive mental qualities, which might well include knowledge 
as surely as it does compassion, hence leaving the door open to an implicit 
admission of the Buddha's omniscience. 
Later in the chapter, during his discussion of the truth of cessation 
(verses 193-199a), Dharmaklrti entertains a number of possible objec-
tions to his claims about the compassion possessed by the Buddha and 
other liberated beings. He notes that although a liberated being has, by 
virtue of a realization of no-self, eliminated the cause necessitating any 
future rebirth, such a being need not immediately transcend the body 
upon attaining liberation, for he or she may remain due the force of pre-
vious karma or because of compassion. Compassion, Dharmakirti has-
tens to add, presupposes the destruction of its opposite, hatred, and the 
cultivation of dispositions (sa1!lskaral;!) to compassion. At base, it 
requires a realization of no-self, without which the destruction of desire, 
hatred, and other forms of self-grasping, are impossible. But, a skeptic 
may ask, (a) does not compassion involve desires, hence passion" on the 
part of the liberated Being? and (b) how can the realization of no-self 
lead to compassion, when the realization involves the negation of the 
very beings toward whom one might be compassionate? Dharmaklrti 
replies that (a) neither passion nor desire in the ordinary sense is possi-
ble where the root of those, self-grasping, has been destroyed, and (b) 
compassion can arise simply through an apprehension of a "suffering 
continuum" (dul;!khasa1!ltana), the impermanent aggregates of a being 
whose substantial existence is only a convention.43 In some liberated 
beings, Dharmaklrti concludes, compassion is slight, so their mainte-
nance of the body (once their projected physical karma has been 
exhausted) will be brief; in others, such as Buddhas, compassion is infi-
nite, so no attempt will be made to leave the present body or avoid tak-
ing another. 
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C. The Buddha as Teacher: PV II: 132-139a, 282a 
Given that the Buddha (or, more properly, future Buddha) was compas-
sionate, i.e., desired to assist all beings in gaining liberation, it follows, says 
Dharmakirti (verse 132), that he would have applied himself to methods 
for removing his own suffering, since liberation and its cause are hidden 
phenomena (parok$a), hence difficult to explain if one has not understood 
and mastered them oneself. Thus (verses 133-136a), one who seeks libera-
tion must understand the nature of suffering, its origin, and the potential 
for stopping that suffering through the application of appropriate counter-
measures. As yet lacking direct experience, one applies reason and scrip-
ture (yuktyagama), each of which is a form of inference, to these issues. 
One ascertains first that suffering is impermanent, in the sense that it is a 
momentary phenomenon. This being so, its causes must also be imperma-
nent. What are they? And what opposes them? Following tradition, 
Dharmakirti asserts (verses 135b-136a): 
The cause is desire (sneha) effected by grasping at self and what per-
tains to self (atmatmlyagrahakrta), 
Which is the field of formations (saIf/skaragocara) [of further suffer-
ing]; the opposite of that, seeing no-self (nairatmyadarsana) is [its] 
destroyer. 
With that understanding, Dharmaklrti notes (verses 136b-137), one devel-
ops a range of methods over a vast period of time, i.e., myriads of lives, 
and gains perfect clarity about the virtues and flaws (gunado;;al)) of all 
entities and actions relative to suffering and liberation, thereby destroying 
th~ subtle propensities (vasana) to perpetuate the cause of suffering. This 
elimination even of the subtle propensities to the cause of suffering distin-
guishes the Great Sage (mahamum) from such practitioners as the Solitary 
Buddha (pratyekabuddha) and, presumably, the Disciple (sravaka); he also 
is distinguished by his willingness to exert himself for the sa ke of others 
(verse 138a). 
In short, concludes Dharmakirti (verse 138b), it is just this development 
of countless methods (upayabhyasa) that is the "teaching" (sasanaIf/) 
taught by the Buddha in his capacity as Teacher, since the methods are 
developed precisely for the purpose (artlla) of their being taught; alterna-
tively, those methods-most especially the crucial realization of no-self-
are the Teacher because they are the object (artha) of his cognition on the 
path to liberation, and will be taught to others as the necessary objects of 
their cognition on their paths to liberation. Or, as he will put it later (verse 
282a), "teaching is application to knowledge for the sake of others." 
Concluding his discussion of the Buddha as Universally Benevolent and 
Teacher-i.e., as infinitely compassionate and experienced in countless 
methods- DharmakIrti adds (verse 139a) that these two epithets are dis-
cussed first because they precede, hence are in some sense causes of, the 
attainment (ni$pattl) that one seeks, namely, one's own enlightenment 
(being Well-Gone) and that of others (being Savior). 
DharmakIrti's concept of what it means to call the Buddha "the Teacher" 
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appears somewhat unconventional until we understand that the countless 
methods that he developed over multiple lives are themselves his teacher, 
very much as we speak of "experience being the teacher," and, when trans-
mitted to and practiced by others, will serve in the same way as their teach-
ers. Of these methods, it is quite clear that the crucial one is the single tech-
nique that can extirpate the self-grasping that is ultimate cause of suffering: 
realization of no-self. In an extended sense, then, our true teacher is this 
realization. Dharmaklrti stresses the development of this realization, and 
other methods, over the course of many lives because, just as universal 
compassion cannot be developed instantly, so the methods that lead one to 
freedom require long cultivation. Whether this means that the existence of 
past and future lives is a sine qua non for the development of liberating 
methods as it is for universal compassion, Dharmakirti does not say, but it 
would seem from context that this probably was his view. 
D. The Buddha as Well-Gone: PV II: 139b-145a, 280b-281b 
Having demonstrated and to some degree described the causes a 
Buddha-to-be must perfect in order to become a Buddha, Dharmakirti turns 
next to an account of the results of the perfection of those causes, the 
Buddha's status as Well-Gone and Savior. He defines well-goneness (sugat-
va), the Buddha's perfection of his own aims, simply as "abandonment of 
the cause [of suffering]" (heta'1 praMIJ.arp.) (verse 139b), but then (following 
Dignaga) goes on to specify (verses 139b-142b) that that abandonment has 
three characteristics. (1) It is good, or praiseworthy (sa$ta), because, founded 
on a view of or application to the fact of no-self, it leaves no basis for further 
suffering. (2) It is irreversible (apunar agama), because it entails abolition of 
the seed of future rebirths, which is belief in self; the opposite of that, the 
realization of no-self, is effective, and cannot be reversed, because it is 
true-and truth, once firmly established, never can be supplanted by error. 
And, (3) it is remainderless (ase$a), because in it, due to long and thorough 
development of the realization of no-self, not just defilements (klesa) have 
been extinguished, but also such subtle, lingering problems as illnesses of 
body, speech, or mind, or ineptitude in explaining the path. 
Dharmaklrti then (verses 142b-145a) considers a possible Mimarnsaka 
objection, namely, that the speech of any person (as opposed to the testi-
mony of the etemal Veda), will be flawed simply by virtue of his or her 
being a person, and that the Buddha, as person, cannot therefore be flaw-
less. Dharmaklrti replies that, logically speaking, this is at best a doubtful 
assertion, for it is neither self-evident nor inductively concluded that all 
persons who are speakers possess flaws. To the further M1marnsaka (or 
perhaps materialist) contention that flaws cannot be eliminated because 
they are either (a) permanent, (b) impermanent but indestructible by any 
method, or (c) destructible only by methods that remain unknown, 
Dharmaki'rti replies that (a) their impermanence is demonstrated by their 
causal nature, (b) their destructibility is assured by the existence of an anti-
dote, the realization of no-self, and (c) knowledge of that method is guar-
anteed by the fact that the Buddha has correctly identified the antidote: 
realization of no-self is true and basic, hence soteriologically effective. 
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Towards the end of the chapter (verses 280b-281b), Dharmaklrti returns 
to the Buddha's status as Well-Gone, this time focusing on its gnostic 
implications, a move that is justified by the fact that the past passive par-
ticiple gata in sugata may mean either "gone" or "known." Mirroring his 
earlier discussion, he assigns the Buddha's knowledge (jnlina) three charac-
teristics. (1) It is knowledge of reality, or the truth (tattva), specifically, the 
"good" or "praiseworthy" truth of the non-existence of a substantial self. 
This aspect of his knowledge distinguishes the Buddha from all non-
Buddhists. (2) It is knowledge that is firm (sthira), for realization of no-self 
assures that one never need take rebirth again. This aspect of his knowl-
edge distinguishes the Buddha from Buddhists who still are in training, 
i.e., are not yet liberated. And, (3) it is knowledge that is complete or 
remainderless (ase?a), for it involves knowledge of all possible methods of 
attaining freedom oneself or assisting others to attain it. This aspect of his 
knowledge distinguishes the Buddha from Buddhists who are beyond 
training, i.e., liberated Disciples and Solitary Buddhas, but lack a full reper-
toire of methods that they have practiced and might impart to others. 
Thus, from Dharmaklrti's perspective, the Buddha's achievement of his 
own aims means fundamentally that he has stopped suffering, and need 
no longer be reborn, for he has realized, and developed to the nth degree, 
the truth that is essential in matters of birth, rebirth, and liberation, namely, 
the absence of an enduring self anywhere in the cosmos. As "abandon-
ment," his "Well-Goneness" is good, irreversible, and remainderless, as 
"knowledge," it is true, firm, and, again, remainderless-all because he has 
seen the nature and cause of suffering, the possibility of its cessation, and 
the path to that cessation. This, claim, however, remains a general one. If 
the Buddha can be shown to have been mistaken in his analysis of suffer-
ing and its cessation, then we cannot call him Well-Gone, nor-no matter 
how great his compassion or experience-can we regard him as a Savior 
for suffering sentient beings, for he only would serve to delude them, as he 
has deluded himself. Thus, Dharmaklrti turns next to an extended proof of 
the four noble truths, whose demonstration will assure us the Buddha is 
rightly regarded as the Savior. 
E. The Buddha as Savior: PV II: 145b-146a, 280b-283a 
The discussion of the Buddha as Savior covers nearly half of the 
Prama1J.asiddhi chapter. The vast majority of this discussion, however, is 
taken up by an extended proof of the four noble truths, whose truth is, as 
just noted, a sine qua /Ion for the Buddha's status as Savior. Because most of 
this proof has little to do with the actual characteristics that the Buddha 
possesses by virtue of being Savior, we will pass over it summarily, focus-
ing only on those few passages that are relevant to Dharmaklrti's view of 
what it means for the Buddha to act as a Savior. 
The first of these occurs just before the beginning of the proof of the four 
noble truths (verses 145b-146a). Salvation (tayah), Dharmakirti tells us, 
entails proclaiming to others 'the path that one has seen for oneself 
(svadr!?tamargoktir). if it be argued that, despite having seen the path to 
liberation, the Buddha might either (a) proclaim it falsely or (b) not pro-
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claim it at all, the reply is that (a) misleading others presupposes a selfish 
aim, which the Buddha cannot entertain, and, furthermore, (b) because of 
his compassion (daya), the Buddha's every effort is for the sake of others. 
Accordingly, concludes Dharmakirti, the Buddha is an authority, and, as 
rGyal tshab rje adds: 
[The Buddha] is an authoritative person for those intent on freedom, 
because through showing the path to liberation to [them], he becomes 
their Savior, and he has complete ability to save [them]. If he cannot 
save them, then he does not fulfill the definition of a Savior, and if he 
does not save them, he does not accomplish what is needed by those 
seeking salvation. In this teacher, ability and necessity meet.44 
Alternatively, DharmakIrti notes (verse 146b), salvation means revelation 
of the four noble truths--whose truth, over the course of the next 137 verses, 
he attempts to prove. The proofs of the truths of suffering and origination 
involve (a) refuting claims that suffering arises causelessly, from a perma-
nent cause, such as ISvara, or from physical sources, such as the humors or 
elements, and (b) showing that suffering does have causes, that those causes 
are primarily mental (especially craving and ignorance), and that its occur-
rence is occasional, so that it is impermanent, hence subject to elimination. 
The proofs of the truths of cessation and path involve (a) refuting claims that 
liberation is either impossible or achieved through such inappropriate means 
as contemplation of a permanent self, performing divinely-empowered ritu-
als, or engaging in extreme austerities, and (b) showing that of all possible 
methods, the realization of no-self alone can provide a reliable basis for liber-
ation, and that, once attained, liberation cannot be supplanted by error, nor 
does it require immediate transcendence of the body. There are more twists 
and turns in this section than possibly can be summarized. For the moment, 
suffice it to say that if Dharmakirti succeeds in showing that (a) no-self is 
true, (b) self-grasping is the only plausible explanation for suffering, (c) a 
truth, once grasped, cannot be uprooted, then he has at least laid the founda-
tions for showing that the Buddha is a Savior. How successful he is~r even 
could be-is difficult to say, for an assessment will depend not just on the 
coherence of Dharmaklrti's arguments, but on an analysis of the assump-
tions he brings to the arguments, not all of which are easily detectable."5 
In any case, at the conclusion of his proof of the four noble truths (vers-
es 280b-283a), Dharmaklrti is confident of his success. He reiterates that 
the Buddha is a Savior, and draws out the implications of this fact. 
Because he is Savior, he must possess good, firm, and complete knowl-
edge, i.e., be Well-Gone. If he is Well-Gone, then he must have mastered 
the liberating teaching of no-self, hence be the Teacher. If he has mastered 
this thoroughly and taught it to others, he must have been motivated by 
immense compassion, hence be Universally Benevolent. Finally, because 
in him salvific knowledge, great compassion, broad experience, and peda-
gogical expertise all are developed to the utmost degree, the Buddha may 
with confidence be asserted to be authority itself (pramaI)ata), in other 
words, the Authoritative One (pramaI)abhuta). 
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F. A Summary of Dharmaklrti's Buddha/08Y 
To summarize, DharmakIrti's conception of the Buddha is built upon five 
epithets assigned him by Dignaga: the Authoritative One, Universally 
Benevolent, Teacher, Well-Gone, and Savior. The Authoritative One is the 
basic epithet-it informs us that the Buddha is the truth-teller par excellence, 
who cognizes correctly what must be done and shunned by beings in search 
of spiritual freedom. The fact that he is Universally Benevolent-which 
depends upon the reality of a multiplicity of lives in which to develop com-
passion and other positive mental traits to the nth degree--guarantees that 
he has a powerful motive to cultivate liberating methods and wisdom to the 
utmost. His status as Teacher-synonymous with the liberating methods he 
has mastered, and, most especially, the sine qua non for liberation, the wis-
dom realizing no-self-tells us that he is able to apply himself in the proper 
way so as to free both himself and others. His characterization as Well-Gone 
assures us that he has abandoned suffering and its causes-and knows reali-
ty-as thoroughly as possible. And, his quality of being the Savior entails 
that he has the knowledge, compassion, and power to assist others on the 
spiritual path. In short, the Buddha of Dharmaki"rti is free from taints, limit-
lessly compassionate, and a most skillful teacher of crucial truths. 
These are the positive traits of DharmakIrti's Buddha. Just as important to 
note, however, are traits that the Buddha of the Pramal)avarttika lacks. He 
quite clearly is not like any permanent entity (creative or not) posited in any 
non-Buddhist school, whether the isvara of Nyaya, the Mman of Vedanta 
and Vaise$ika, the pL1m~a of SaJTlkhya, or the jiva of the Jainas, for he is nei-
ther permanent nor a creator. He is an impermanent, embodied, speaking, 
thinking, feeling being, who just happens, over the course of many lifetimes 
of practice, to have discovered what must be done if beings are to attain lib-
eration. He has nothing to do with the creation, maintenance, or destruction 
of the cosmos, which are due above all to the multiple operations of the 
karmic intentions and acts of countless sentient beings. Nor, on the other 
hand, is he much like the Buddha posited by Dharmaki"rti's Mahayana con-
temporaries, for he never is said to possess three "bodies," or kayas. In par-
ticular, he never is overtly assigned the qualities of the most fundamental of 
those bodies, the dharmakaya: complete omniscience, immutability, non-
conceptuality, and pervasion of the entire cosmos. Indeed, if there is a previ-
ous version of the enlightened one that DharmakIrti's Buddha most closely 
resembles, it may be the Buddha of the Pali canon, who clearly is an extraor-
dinary being, far beyond his contemporaries in knowledge, compassion, and 
ability, but still recognizably human, and not yet "cosmicized," or "maximal-
ly great" in the ways approached by Mahayana versions of the Buddha. 
C. Tile Reception of Dharmakirti's Buddhalogy 
The fact that Dharmakirti apparently was a Mahayanist,'6 yet described 
the Buddha in ways perhaps more appropriate to the early tradition, has 
raised the question of his "true" intention in expounding his buddhalogy in 
the Pramal,1c1varttika as he did. It is, of course, possible that he described the 
Buddha exactly as he intended, and there matters rest. This is more or less 
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the interpretation of his first commentator, his disciple, Devendrabuddhi. 
Beginning, however, with Prajnakaragupta (eighth century?), nearly all sub-
sequent commentators assumed that Dharmaki'rti was deliberately present-
ing a "lowest common denominator" version of the Buddha because the 
Pramal.lavarttika was written as much for a non-Buddhist as for a Buddhist 
audience, and the former might be confused (or perhaps emboldened) by 
the presentation of exceedingly complex or controversial versions of 
Buddhist doctrines-including the doctrine of the Buddha. Thus, the 
"Hi'nayanist" buddhalogy of the PramalJdsiddbi chapter veiled a Mahayana 
standpoint, which, with proper interpretive acumen, could be exposed. 
To take just one example, most later commentators assume that,indica-
tions to the contrary notwithstanding, Dharmaki'rti did not criticize the con-
cept of the Buddha's omniscience; quite to the contrary, he often is seen as 
upholding itY Thus, the mockery of omniscience as unnecessary for those 
intent on freedom (verses 30-33) may be taken simply as an indication that 
omniscience is not an essential characteristic of a spiritual teacher, since all 
that is required for liberation is insight into the truth of no-self. 
Furthermore, a number of passages that do not explicitly promote the 
Buddha's omniscience are interpreted as arguing for it implicitly: thus, the 
proof of the limitless expandability of the Buddha's compassion (verses 120-
131) may be read as an implicit demonstration that his knowledge (like any 
positive trait) too must be capable of infinite expansion; his knowledge of 
the four noble truths, i.e., what is to be avoided and what adopted by those 
intent on freedom (verses 146b-280a), may be taken to imply that he must 
know all phenomena, since all phenomena are contained in one of the four; 
and, finally, the designation of his knowledge as "complete," or "remain-
derless" (verse 282b), may be interpreted as an assertion that there is noth-
ing that he does not know, i.e., that he is omniscient. Indeed, ironically, 
most Tibetan teachers today will, when challenged to prove omniscience, 
refer the questioner to the Pramal)asiddhi chapter of the PramalJavarttika.4R 
Nevertheless, while Mahayana philosophers of later generations would 
refer to Dharmaklrti's general characterization of the Buddha with approval, 
and were quite enthusiastic about his rational arguments in support of that 
characterization, his discussion in the PramalJdsiddhi chapter did not 
become a locus classicus for buddha logy in the way that it did for atheology. 
His complete neglect of the trikaya doctrine, and his minimalist description 
of a Buddha that--compared to dominant Mahayana models- was relative-
ly human and relatively acosmic, helped to assure that, though his reputa-
tion as a logician would endure, his vision of the Buddha would eitller be 
ignored or reinterpreted-and in neither case would it set the main agenda 
for Mahayana buddhalogical discussions, which would depend almost 
entirely on the trikaya theory and be driven by the assumption that the 
Buddha must be maximally great. 
V. Conclusion 
The Pramal)dsiddl1i chapter of DharmakIrti's PramalJavarttika is a par-
ticularly interesting locus for examining the atheology of Indian 
Buddhism, because (a) it lays out anti-theistic arguments in a systematic 
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and detailed manner and (b) it also presents a detailed vision of the 
Buddhist ideal being, the Buddha. A comparison between these two 
aspects of the chapter reveals no real ironies or contradictions: 
Dharmakirti rejects the authority, causal efficiency, and experiential 
capabilities, indeed, the very existence, of a variety of forms of the 
divine-especially ISvara-because of their proponents' claim that they 
are permanent entities. At the same time, the Buddha he envisions is a 
being of extraordinary wisdom, compassion, and skill, able to transcend 
salpsara and assist others to do the same, but he is /lot explicitly assigned 
most of the attributes common to Mahayana conceptions of the Buddha, 
especially the dharmakaya: omniscience, non-conceptuality, immutabili-
ty, pervasiveness, and so forth. In that sense, much like the authors of 
the Pali nikayas, and perhaps unlike some Mahayana metaphysicians, 
Dharmakirti presents a buddhalogy that is consonant, rather than in 
some tension, with his atheology. 
Other problems, of course, remain. From the perspective of an intel-
lectual historian, Dharmakirti's buddhalogy-though it should not be 
overlooked in any survey of Indian conceptions of the Buddha-does 
seem somewhat anoma lous in his era, and cannot be taken as represen-
tative, especially of later Indian buddhalogies, which tend toward maxi-
mization. From the perspective of an Indian theist, Dharmakirti's refuta-
tions of theism will be seen to rest on (a) inadequate representations of 
theism, (b) incoherent arguments, and (c) presuppositions-e.g., about 
radical and universal impermanence-that are themselves as problemat-
ic as those undergirding theism. From the perspective of modern non-
Indian theists such as Christians, it remains to be determined (a) 
whether any of the beings posited by Hindus and rejected by 
Dharmakirti are similar enough to the monotheistic "God" to make 
arguments about them of more than academic interest, (b) if the argu-
ments are of theological import, whether they offer challenges not 
already posed by Western critics of theism, and, if so, (c) whether an 
adequate response can or should be framed!9 Finally, for the modern 
Buddhist, as perhaps for Dharmaklrti's contemporaries and successors, 
questions may remain as to whether his buddhalogy-even if it is con-
sistent with his atheology, as well as with general conceptions of the 
Buddha that date to the very beginnings of the tradition-may not pre-
sent the Buddhist "supreme being" as too much of a rationalist, too 
human, too modest in his attainments, at least when compared with the 
cosmic prospects and fathomless mysteries opened by trikaya theory in 
general and the conception of dharmak[iya in particular. 
Nevertheless, few Buddhists have presented as internally coherent and 
skillfully defended an exposition of their entire world-view, or as sharp an 
attack on the alternatives, as Dharmakirti did in the Pram(1)avarttika in gen-
eral and the Pram(1)asiddhi chapter in particular. No one, whether Indian or 
Westerner, who is seriously interested in the great questions of philosophy 
and theology can neglect what he had to say there. If he's right, after all, the 
Buddhist world-view has been vindicated, and our destiny is dependent on 
thoroughly comprehending the four noble truths, and, most especially, the 
fact that there is no enduring substance anywhere in the cosmos. If we com-
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prehend this, we may begin to eliminate suffering; if we do not, our suffer-
ing will continue, not only in this life, but in lives to come. And, the vicissi-
tudes of saIJIsara being as they are, we'd all best become Buddhists now, 
while the becoming's good. 
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3. Van A. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological Terms (New York: Macmillan, 
1964) p. 235. 
4. These include, in addition to those listed, ,;\svagho:;;a" Nagarjuna, 
Vasubandhu, Asanga, Bhavaviveka, Dharmaklrti, Santideva, Santarak:;;ita, 
KamalasIla, Jfianasrimitra, and the authors of a number of the Buddhist 
tantras. For an anthology of some of these sources, see Nyanaponika Thera, 
ed., Buddhism and the God Idea (The Wheel Publication, no. 47; Kandy: Buddhist 
Publication Society, 1981). For summaries of some of the major Buddhist argu-
lnents, see, e.g., George Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist Refutations of 
ISvara as the Creator of the Universe" (Wiener Zeitschrift fur des Kunst Sud- und 
Ost-asien, vol. 12-13,1968-69, pp. 85-100); Roger Jackson, "DharmakIrti's refu-
tation of theism" (Philosophy East and West, vol. 36, 1986, pp. 315-348); and 
Richard Hayes, "Principled Atheism in the Buddhist Scholastic Tradition" 
(Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 16, 1988, pp. 5-28). For a tantric perspective on 
the issue, see Ronald M. Davidson, "Reflections on the Mahesvara Subjugation 
Myth: Indic Materials, Sa-skya-pa Apologetics, and the Birth of Heruka" (The 
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 14, 1991, pp. 
197-235). 
5. In addition to the Nyaya (traditionally paired with Vaise:;;ika), manifest-
ly theistic schools include later Saypkhya (traditionally paired with Yoga) and 
Visi:;;tadvaita Vedanta. The Buddhists' main interlocutors in theistic debate 
were the Naiyayikas-for the two rose to philosophical prominence at around 
the same time, the early first millennium CE; Saqtkhya's heyday preceded this 
era, while Visi:;;tadvaita arose so late that its proponents found few Buddhists 
available any longer to debate. At the same time, Buddhist critics of theism 
were reacting not just to formal philosophicaJ arguments, but also to the popu-
lar devotional theism, whether Vai:;;l)ava or Saiva, that informed the lives of so 
many Hindus for so long. For a useful overview of Hindu formulations of the 
divine, see Jose Pereira, Hindu Theology: A Reader (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor I Doubleday, 1976). For overviews of Nyaya, see, e.g., S. N. Dasgupta, 
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A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975); 
Karl H. Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyfiya-
Vaise$ika up to Gangesa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). For 
Sarnkhya, see Dasgupta, op. cit.; and Gerald Larson and Ram Shankar 
Bhattacharya, SfiJ!lkhya: J\ Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987). For Visi~tadvaita, see John Carman, The 
Theology of Rlimanuja (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). For an 
overview of Indian atheism, which includes references to Buddhist, Jaina, 
Mimarnsaka, and Lokayata sources, see Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Indian 
Atheism (Calcutta: Manisha, 1969). 
§. For assertions of this view, see, e.g., Kamaleshwar ]3hattacharya, 
L'Atman-Brahman dans Ie Bouddhisme Ancien (Publications de l'Ecole Fran~aise 
d'Extreme-Orient, no. 90; Paris: Ecole Fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient, 1973); and 
Raimundo Pannikar, The Silence of God, the Answer of the Buddha, tr. Robert R. 
Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). 
7. The most articulate recent spokesman for this position has been Paul J. 
Griffiths, e.g., in his On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). There, and in his seminal 
article, "Buddha and God: A Contrastive Study in Ideas about Maximal 
Greatness" (Journal of Religion, vol. 69, 1989, pp. 502-529), Griffiths seems to 
argue not only that Buddhists did adopt an increasingly God-like conception of 
Buddha, but that they had to, since religious theorizing about the ultimate is 
driven by the need to maximize that which is regarded as highest, truest, or 
most real. Without going into the strengths and weaknesses of this provocative 
idea, I would note that it is eerily reminiscent of the ontological argument for 
God's existence, but applied to the realm of intellectual history. 
8. D. L. Snellgrove, ed. & tr., The Hevajra Tantra: A Critical Study (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1959) vol. I, p. 77. For further perspectives on tantric 
"theism," see Eva K. Dargyey, "The Concept of a 'Creator Cod' in Tantric 
Buddhism" (The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 8, 
no. 1, 1985, pp. 31-47); and E. K. Neumaier-Dargyey, The Sovereign All-Creating 
Mind, the Motherly Buddha: A Translation of the Kun byed rgyal pa'i mdo 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 
9. Buddhalogy, by which I mean a theory about Buddha, is to be distin-
guished from Buddhology, which has become a common term for the academ-
ic study of Buddhism. 
10. On Dignaga, see especially M. Hattori, Dignfiga, On Perception: Being the 
Pratyak$apariccheda of Dignfiga's Pramfi1)asamuccaya (Harvard Oriental 
Series, XLVII; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Richard P. 
Hayes, Dignfiga 011 the Interpretation of Signs (Boston: D. Reidel, 1988). 
11. On Dharmaklrti in general, see, e.g., F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic 
(2 vols.; reprint, New York: Dover, 1962); Nagin J. Shah, AkaJmika's Criticism of 
Dharmakirti's Philosophy (LD. series, no. 11; Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of 
Indology, 1967); Ernst Steinkellner, ed., Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological 
Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakirti Conference, Vienna, 
June 11-16, 1989 (Bei~rage zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, nr. 8; 
Wien: Akademie der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991); R. 
Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible? Dharmakirti and rGyal tshab Ije on Knowledge, 
Rebirth, No-Self and Liberation (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1993), pp. 109-145; and 
Georges Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan 
Interpretations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). Much of the 
pioneering scholarly work on Dharmakirti is in German, in the works of, e.g., 
Erich Frauwallner, Tilmann Vetter, and Ernst Steinkellner, though much of 
value has been published as well in English and Japanese. Besides those 
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already noted, scholars who have contributed significantly to Dharmaklrti 
studies include Tom J. F. Tillemans, Christian Lindtner, Eli Franco, Claus 
Oetke, Brendan Gillon, Richard P. Hayes, Takashi Iwata, Sh6ryu Katsura, 
Katsumi Mimaki, Mangala Chinchore, David P. Jackson, and Leonard van der 
Kuijp. Their works are too numerous to list here; the most thorough recent bib-
liographies of works by and about Dharmaklrti are found in Ernst Steinkellner 
and M. T. Much, Textc der erkennitnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus 
(G6ttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1995), pp. 23-44; Dreyfus, pp. 
581-597; and Eli Franco, Dharmakirti on Compassion and Rebirth (Wiener 
Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, heft 38; Wien: Arbeitskreis fur 
Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1997), pp. 342-360. 
For an approach to understanding Indian Buddhist philosophy through the 
complementary lenses of Dharmaklrti and Nagarjuna, see R. Jackson, 
"Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in 
Buddhist Thought" (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. LVII, 1989, 
pp.561-589). 
12. These are generally counted as seven. Three of the texts deal with a full 
range of issues in logic and epistemology: the PramaJ.lavarttika ("Commentary 
on Authority"), Prama1)aviniscaya (" Ascertainment of Authority"), and 
Nyayabindu ("Drop of Reasoning"). The other four deal with more particular 
matters: the Hetubilldu ("Drop of Logical Reason") analyzes the nature of syllo-
gisms, the Vadanyaya ("Science of Debate") deals with methods of disputa-
tion, the SaT[lbandhaparik$a ("Examination of Relations") scrutinizes relation-
ality, and the Santanantarasiddhi ("Proof of Other Continua") is a refutation of 
solipsism. Of these seven, only the Prama1)avarttika, Nyayabindu, and 
Vadanyaya have been preserved ill toto in Sanskrit. For the others, Tibetan 
translations and Sanskrit fragments are available. See Ernst Steinkellner, Vcrsc-
Index of Dharmakirti's Works (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und 
Buddhismuskunde, heft 1; Wien: Arbeitskreis fUr Tibetische und 
Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1977). 
13. The most widely utilized modern edition of the Prama1)avarttika is that 
of Y. Miyasaka: Prama1)avarttika-KJrikJ (Sanskrit and Tibetan) (Acta Indologica, 
2, 1971-72), which is taken by most scholars to supersede the earlier editions, 
either partial or complete, prepared by Rahul Sankrtyayana (1938), Raniero 
Gnoli (1960), and Dwarikadas Shastri (1968). No complete translation into a 
Western language has yet been published. The SvJrthc'inumana chapter has 
been partially translated in Satkari Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki, tr., The 
PramJl.1avarttikam of Dharmakirti [SvarthanumJna Chapter, verses 1-511 (Patna: 
Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, 1968), and Leonard Zwilling, Dharmakfrti on 
Apoha: The Ontology, Epistemology and Semantics of Negation in the 
Svarthanumanapariccheda of the Pramal)avarttika (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976). On the Pramal.1asiddhi chapter, 
which probably has received the most sustained attention, see below, note 15. 
No translations of major portions of the Pratyak$a or Pararthlnumana chapters 
have so far been published, though they have been mined by a number of 
scholars, including many of those listed above in note 11. 
14. On differences between Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, see, recently, Hayes, 
Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs; Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Dharmaklrti on 
prasiddha and yogyatJ" (Studia Indologiczne [Warsaw], 4,1997, pp. 177-194; and 
Sh. Katsura, "Dignaga and Dharmaklrti on apoha" (in Steinkellner, Studies, pp. 
129-146). 
15. There has been disagreement among modern scholars (and, to a lesser 
degree, ancient Indian commentators) about the proper ordering of the chap-
ters of the Prama1)avarttika; here, I have followed the convention favored by 
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Dharmaklrti's earliest Indian commentators, as well as by all of Tibetan tradi-
tion. The alternative ordering, suggested by the later Indian commentator 
Manorathjnandin, and followed by most modern editors of the Sanskrit text of 
the Pramal)avarttika, is: (1) Pramal)asiddhi, (2) Pratyak?a, (3) Svarthiinumana, 
and (4) Pararthanumana. For a discussion, see, e.g., R. Jackson, If; Enlightenment 
Possible?, p. 167, n. 1. 
16. No complete Western-language translation of the Sanskrit slokas of the 
Pramal)asiddhi chapter has yet been published. Masatoshi Nagatomi translat-
ed the entire text as his PhD. dissertation for Harvard University (1957: A 
Study of Dharmakirti's PramaQavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation 
of the PramaQavarttika, Book J), but, regrettably, never has revised it for publica-
tion. R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, includes a complete translation of 
the Tibetan translation, as seen through the commentary of the fifteenth centu-
ry scholar, rGyal tshab rje-but in most cases, the translations are at a consider-
able remove from a straightforward reading of the original Sanskrit. Partial 
translations directly from the Sanskrit include those found in T. Vetter, Der 
Buddha Ilnd Scine Lchre in Dharmakfrtis Pramal)avarttika (verses 146c-187; 
Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, heft 12; Wien: 
Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1984); 
Vittorio van Bijlert, Epistelllology lind Spiritual Authority (verses 1-7; Wiener 
Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, heft 20; Wien: Arbeitskreis fur 
Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1989); and Franco, 
Dharmaklrti on Compassion and Rebirth (verses 34-72). Articles on the 
Pramal.lasiddhi chapter are too numerous to list; for fairly complete references, 
see the bibliographies in R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?; and Franco, 
Dharmaklrti 011 Compassionllnd Rebirth. 
17. Daniel Arnold, "Can Hartshorne Escape Dharmaklrti? Some 
Reflections with Implications for the Comparative Philosophy of Religion" 
(American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 1, 1998, p. 31, 
(Emphasis in the original.) 
18. The exact meaning of pramal)abhflta has been much debated. It may 
mean "one who is authority" or "one who hilS become authority." 1 opt for the 
adjectival form "authoritative one," though I recognize that pramal)a is, techni-
cally, a noun. For a good discussion of the issue, see Franco, Dharmakirti on 
Compllssion and Rebirth, pp. 16-17, note 3. 
19. On this verse, and its influence on the Pramal)asiddhi chapter, see, e.g., 
the seminal articles by Masatoshi Nagatomi ("The Framework of the 
Pramfil)avarttika, Book I," Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 79, 1959, 
pp. 253-256); and Ernst Steinkellner ("The Spiritual Place of the 
Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism," Nanto Bukkyo, vol. 49, 1982, pp. 1-18). 
See also R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, p. 127, note 4; 169, note 8; and 
"The Buddha as Pramal)abhflta: Epithets and Arguments in the Buddhist 
'Logical' Tradition" (Journal of Indian Philof;ophy, vol. 16, 1988, pp. 335-365). The 
most complete discussion of the topic is found in Franco, Dharmakfrti on 
Compassion and Rebirth, pp. 15-43; see also his list of articles on the topic, op. cit., 
p. 15, note 2. 
20. Though many Indian and virtually all Tibetan and modern scholars 
take these verses as providing a seminal Buddhist definition of pramal)a, Eli 
Franco argues (Dharmakfrti on Compassion and Rebirth, pp. 45-66) that 
Dharmaklrti was not concerned primarily to give a precise definition of the 
term (indeed, few Indian philosophers of his time did so), but to provide a sort 
of working definition that would be acceptable to all possible opponents. 
Given that in the Pramal)asiddhi chapter Dharmaklrti does seem at pains to 
present many terms and problems in their "lowest common denominator" 
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form, there is a certain logic to Franco's argument; at the same time, it is not 
hard to see how later Buddhist writers found the seeds of a specifically 
Buddhist definition in Dharmakirti's verses. 
21. There has been considerable disagreement among commentators and 
scholars over which verses are covered by which demonstration; for a discus-
sion, see R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, p. 128, note 2. 
22. On these arguments, see especially R. Jackson, "Dharmakirti's refuta-
tion of theism," pp. 323-335; Is Enlightenment Possible?, pp. 193-214. My trans-
lations in both the article and the book are rooted in the Tibetan version of 
Dharmakirti's text, and are only generally reliable as a guide to the Sanskrit 
original, for which see Nagatomi, A Study, pp. 17-38. 
23. Nagatomi (A Study, p. 16) calls this reading "fanciful." It is, however, 
the interpretation followed by numerous Tibetan commentators (e.g., rGyal 
tshab rje; see R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment Possible?, pp. 193-194), who, like 
Manorathanandin, undoubtedly chose their interpretation on the basis of the 
verse's focus on the term bhOta, and their own tendency to associate the term 
bhOta with a process of becoming or change. On the other hand, it may simply 
be that Dharmakirti intended the assertion of bhOta to mean that the Buddha is 
authoritative, rather than not. 
24. Dharmakirti does not specify until the very end of this section that the 
entity under discussion is the creator-God of the Naiyayikas, i.e., fsvara, but 
the coherence of the argument, the unmistakable identity of the syllogism to be 
refuted in the following verses, and the glosses of commentators, all add up to 
a persuasive argument that fsvara is intended throughout. 
25. Note the importation here of two fundamental axioms, i.e., the imper-
manence of all entities and the necessary ontological conformity between sub-
ject and object. Each of these might be subject to critique by a theist, though 
Dharmaklrti is not without resources in defending these axioms, which are 
demonstrated elsewhere in his writings and in the writings of other Buddhist 
philosophers, e.g. Vasubandu before him and santaraki?ita after him. 
26. For a rather technical, but interesting, discussion of the possible sources 
for the syllogism Dharmakirti seeks to refute, see Kyo Kano, "On the 
Background of PV II 12ab - The Origin of Dharmakirti's Idea of Arthakriya" 
(in Steinkellner, Studies, pp. 121-128). 
27. pravrttisaIJIsthanavise~arthak:riyadi~u. 
28. 'jig rten gyi gnas Ius long spyod rnams chos can / byed pa po'i bIo 
sngon du song ste / sdod cing sdod cing las la Jug pa'i phyir / ste'u bzhin 
dbyibs kyi khyad par dang ldan pa'i phyir / bun songs bzhin /don byed nus 
pa'i pllyir / dgra sta bzllin / zhes. See rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen, rNam 'greI 
thar lam gsal byed: Tshad ma rnam grel gyi tshig Ie'ur byas pa'i rnam bshad 
phyin ci ma log par gsaI bar byed pa (2 \'ols.; Samath: Pleasure of Elegant 
Sayings Press [Tibetan Monastery], 1974), vol. I, p. 241; trans. R. Jackson, Is 
Enlightenment Possible?, p. 199. The bracketed explanations are my own inter-
polation. The argument appears to contain elements of at least two types of 
argument for God's existence familiar in the West: design arguments (especial-
ly in reason b) and teleological arguments (especially in reason c and, to a less-
er extent, a). 
29. Verse 20b is found only in the Tibetan translation, and not in any 
known edition of the Sanskrit original. 
30. The only argument that Dharmakirti confronts explicitly is the argu-
ment from design (verses 11-20, especially 11-13). I have chosen here to view 
verses 21 and 22-28 as rejecting, respectively, the arguments from intermittence 
and effectuality, because I think that they are addressed there at least implicit-
ly; commentarial tradition, on the other hand, tends to regard verses 21-28 as 
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concerned primarily with demonstrating, from a variety of angles, that a per-
manent entity cannot be shown to be causally efficacious. 
31. yatha tat karaI)arp vastu tathaiva tadakara~la1l1 / yada tat karaI)arp 
kena matam nestamakarannam. 
32. It is' prob~bly fair to 'point out that the Buddhist notion of karma, which 
Dharmaklrti asserts to be the multiple, conscious "creator" behind worldly 
abodes, bodies, and enjoyments, is itself (a) difficult to prove and (b) virtually 
ubiquitous, and so not entirely immune to the difficulties posed by the concept 
of fsvara. 
33. The Nyaya view-at least as interpreted by Dharmaklrti-was that nei-
ther sense-faculty nor object alters from the moment when they do not cause 
cognition to the moment when they do; otherwise, it could not reasonably be 
asserted that those particular faculties perceived those particular objects. This 
is a consequence that the Buddhist, committed to a view of radical momentari-
ness, is willing to accept, though explaining causality in light of such a view is 
nearly as difficult as (some would say more difficult than) accounting for it the-
istically. 
34. nityanarp prati$edhena nesvarades ca sambhava./:! I asamarthyad .... 
I/, 
35. du./:!khotpadasya hetutvarp bandho nityasya tat kuta./:! / adu./:!khotpa-
dahetutvalJ1 mok$o nityasya tat kuta./:! / /. 
36. nityasya nirapek$atvJt kramotpattir virudhyate II kriyayam akriyayafi 
ca kriya ca sadrSJtmana~l I aikyafi ca hetuphalayor vyatireke tatas tayo./:! II 
kartrbhoktrtvahani~l syJt samarthyafi ca na sidhyati I. 
37. For a brief discussion of post-Dharmaklrti developments in both 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions, see R. Jackson, "Dhannaklrti's refuta-
tion of theism," pp. 335-338. The most extensive anti-theis~ argument available 
in English translation is found in the Tattvasarpgraha of Santarak~ita, and the 
pafijika (commentary) upon it of KamalasIla: see Ganganatha Jha, tr., The 
Tattvasarpgralla of Santaraksita with th~ Commentary of Kamalasfla (2 vols.; 
Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1937-1939). Santarak:;;ita and Kamalasila not only 
reiterate and extend Dharmaklrti's arguments against fsvara, but go into con-
siderably greater detail than he does in attacking such concepts as puru$a and 
Mman,too. 
38. On the buddhalogy of these and other MahiYina digests, see, most 
notably, Griffiths, On Being Buddha, Malcolm David Eckel, To See the Buddha: A 
Buddhist Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), and John J. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of 
Controversy in India and Tibet (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1997). 
39. Though it should be noted that Mimarpsakas reject such attainments as 
extra-sensory perception and omniscience in part to clear the way for the asser-
tion that the Veda alone is an ultimate source of authority, a view that 
Dharmaklrti rejects at numerous places in the Pram,il.lavarttika, most common-
lyon the grounds that scriptures-like words-never can be independent 
authorities, but, rather, derive such authority as they have from the reliability 
of those who composed them (and all scriptures, contrary to Mlmarpsaka 
claims about the Veda, must have authors). 
40. heyopadeyatattvasya hanyupayasya vedaka./:! I ya./:! pramaI)am asav 
i$to na tu sarvasya vedaka./:! I I. 
41. For an astute analysis of Dharmaklrti's (and Candraklrti's) stance on 
the nature of the Buddha's cognitions, see John D. Dunne, "Thoughtless 
Buddha, Passionate Buddha" (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 
LXIV, 1996, pp. 525-556). Working primarily from DharmakIrti's PramaI)avart-
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tikasvopaiijavrtti/ the author's own commentary to the SvarthanumaI)a chapter 
of the Pramal)avarttika (and working secondarily from the 
Santanantarasiddhl), Dunne notes that, despite the philosopher's "rather dim 
view of conceptuality" as involving us intrinsically in cognitive error, because 
it gives us generic images (or representations) rather than unique particulars 
(p. 531), he nowhere denies that the Buddha possesses concepts, remaining, it 
seems, non-committal on the topic (p. 533). Certainly, a pramal)abhiita cannot 
be implicated in error, or he would cease to be reliable, yet concepts have an 
instrumental value, and the Buddha obviously taught by means of them. 
Perhaps, suggests Dunne (p. 534), the Buddha remains authoritative despite 
using concepts because concepts may be apprehended as momentary mental 
events, which are therefore particulars, hence in some sense "real." 
I would offer an alternative suggestion, namely, that the "error" involved in 
conceptuality must be seen only in relation to direct perception. We must recall 
that, for Dharmaklrti, there are two sources of authority, perception and infer-
ence. The latter is "conceptual," hence relatively misleading in comparison 
with the "bedrock" of epistemology, direct perception, but it still is veridical-
as long as it is objectively impelled (vastubalapravrtta), i.e., traceable to an 
authoritative perception, whether sensory or mental. Thus, the Buddha may 
entertain (and promulgate) inferences without truly being involved in error 
(see, e.g. PV II: 283b-285a)-though the exact nature of his cognition in the 
course of inferences still would have to be determined. Here, Dunne's sugges-
tion-that the Buddha would through mental perception cognize concepts 
merely as particular mental events, without confusing them with the unique 
particulars apprehended by sense perception-seems quite promising, though 
it would be more persuasive if backed by a more thorough textual analysis 
than he has provided in the article. 
42. Though DharmakIrti's Buddha may not be eternal in the sense of being 
utterly atemporal, he is "everlasting," in that Buddha-cognition will generate 
Buddha-cognition ad infinitum. 
43. On this issue, see also Dunne, op. cit., pp. 535-540. Dunne draws atten-
tion to a fascinating passage in the PramaI)avarttikasvopaiijavrtti, where 
Dharmaklrti engages an opponent in debate on the question whether a 
Buddha's status as a speaker entails desire (raga) on his part. He insists that 
speech does not in itself presuppose desire, but when the opponent presses 
him and demands to know whether the compassion out of which a Buddha 
might speak is conceivable without desire, Dharmaklrti agrees that, in some 
sense, "compassion is desire." This is, as Dunne notes (p. 538) "a stunning con-
clusion" -but he is careful to note that Dharmaklrti does not concede that the 
Buddha has desire in the ordinary, deluded sense, only that he is a being who 
is characterized by perceptions, motives, and affect, that he is, as Dunne puts it 
(p. 540), a "somewhat human" Buddha. 
44. de ehos can / grol ba don gnyer 1a bltos na tshad ma 'i skyes bu yin te / 
gro1 ba don gnyer 1a thar lam bstan pa'i sgo nas deli skyabs mdzad cing de 
skyob pa'i nus pa mthar phyin pa yin pali phyir / skyob mi nus na skyabs kyi 
mtshan nyid ma tshang 1a / skyabs mi byed na skyabs beal ba Ii dgas pa mi 
grub pas ston pa de 1a dgos nus gnyis ka nges par tshogs pa yin no /. In rGyal 
tshab rje, rNam pel thar lam gsal byed, p. 302; tr. R. Jackson, Is Enlightenment 
Possible?, p. 338. 
45. For further discussion of this point, see R. Jackson, "The Buddha as 
PramaI)abhiita," pp. 357-359; Is Enlightenment Possible? pp. 137-145, and anno-
tations to the translation of the proof of the four noble truths (pp. 339-476). 
46. At the very least, we may be certain that (a) Dharmaklrti included in his 
ontology "idealist" views that are most closely associated with a Mahayana 
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philosophical school, the Yogadira or Cittamatra, (b) indicated in a number of 
places that the Buddha was superior to Disciples and Solitary Buddhas, and (c) 
has been commented upon exclusively by Mahayanists. None of these guaran-
tees that he was a Mahayanist, for (a) the assignment of "idealist" views only 
to Mahayana schools is a late scholastic development, which may conceal a 
multitude of uncertainties, (b) references to the Buddha's superiority to 
Disciples and Solitary Buddhas are common in Hinayana literature, too, and 
(c) the allegiances of an author's commentators do not necessarily reveal his 
own allegiances. 
47. For further discussion of this issue, see R. Jackson, "Dharmaklrti's 
Attitude Toward Omniscience," in M. A.. Dhaky and Sagarmal Jain, eds., Pt. 
Dalsukh Bhai Malvaniya Felicitation Volume (Varanasi: P. V. Research Institute, 
1991), vol. 1, pp. 230-246. 
48. In fairness to Dharmakirti's commentators, his later works do reflect a 
marginally more explicit affirmation of the Buddha's omniscience. Thus, near 
the end of the Santanantarasiddhi, he remarks that the Blessed One's omni-
science is inconceivable and inexpressible-but presumably not impossible 
(bsTan 'gyur, che, 359a, in A. W. Barber, ed., The Tibetan Triptaka, Taipei Edition 
[Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1991), vol. 46, p. 589, fol. 717; see also Dunne, 
"Passionate Buddha, Thoughtless Buddha," pp. 533-534). And, in his exposi-
tion of verse 55 of the J'ramal.1aviniscaya, he implies that the destructibility and 
causal efficiency of entities such as the final mental moment of an arhat are 
vouchsafed by the Buddha's cognition of them, which may be an indication of 
his omniscience (see E. Steinkellner, DharmakIrti's Pramanaviniscayai), Zweites 
Kapitel: Svarthanumanam, Teil I: Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte 
[Veroffentlichungen der KOlpmission fUr Sprachen und Kulturen Sudasiens, 
Heft 12; Wi en: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
1973], pp. 76, 78; translated at E. Steinkellner, Dh.~rmaklrti's 
Pramanaviniscayal), Zweites Kl7pitel: Svarthanumiinam, Teil II: Ubersetzung 
und Anmerkungen [Veroffentlichungen der ~.ommission fur Sprachen und 
Kulturen Siidasiens, Heft 15; Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1979], pp. 88-93). Neither of these passages strikes me as a 
completely unambiguous assertion of the Buddha's omniscience, but, as on 
several occasions in the J'rama~lavarttika, they may be taken as implying it. I 
would like to thank Sara McClintock for drawing my attention to these two 
passages. 
49. For a most interesting discussion of this problem, keyed not to classical 
Christian conceptions of God, but rather to process theology, see Arnold, "Can 
Hartshorne Escape Dharmaklrti?" Arnold argues that cross-cultural theologi-
cal certainty is neither desirable nor possible, since theology cannot, in the end, 
be reduced to propositions; rather, it is a high-order expression of a complex 
intellectual and affective process that is inevitably as "rife with tensions" as life 
itself (p. 32). This view is an understandable one, given (a) many philosophers' 
doubts, at the turn of the millennium, that certainty is possible or rationality 
unlimited and (b) Arnold's particular grounding in process metaphysics-yet 
it is a view with which I believe Dharmak'irti would disagree, for his philoso-
phy as a whole, and certainly the J'ramal)asiddhi chapter of the J'ramal)avartti-
ka, is predicated on a profound confidence that the world is in a certain way, 
and can rationally be proven to be so. For further reflections on Dharmaklrti's 
philosophical stance, see R. Jackson, "Matching Concepts"; John Powers, 
"Empiricism and Pragmatism in the Thought of Dharmak'irti and William 
James" (American Journal of The%gyl7nd Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 1, 1994, pp. 
~9-85); and G. Dreyfus, "Is Dharmaklrti a Pragmatist?" (Asiatische Studien / 
Etudes Asiatiques, vol. 49, no. 4, 1995, pp. 671-691). 
